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In what is historically a brief number of years, the life and times of John F. Kennedy 
have taken on legendary proportions. His presidency began with something less than a 
mandate from the American people, but he brought to the White House an inspiration and 
a style that offered great promises of things to come. 
This study provides a political biography of John F. Kennedy and education. In 
addition, it investigates the records of past presidents and congresses, as well as the school 
aid lobby. This account also draws upon the vast body of historical, educational, and political 
material on John Kennedy. Chapter I traces Kennedy's record on federal aid as a 
Congressman (194 7-1953) and Senator (1953-1960). Chapter II focuses on the role federal 
aid to education played during the 1960 presidential campaign. The chapter will examine the 
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statements of both candidates and party platforms regarding the future role of the federal 
government in education. In addition, the history and role of the National Education 
Association in past presidential administrations will be discussed. Chapter Ill examines the 
"New Frontier" and Kennedy's use of the Hovde Task Force on Education to define policies 
for the new administration. The approach of previous presidential administrations is examined 
and the model which John Kennedy chose to follow. Chapter Ill provides an analysis of 
Kennedy's successful attempt to enlarge the House Rules Committee. An early test for 
Kennedy, it proved to be a costly victory for the new administration. Chapter IV offers a 
critical analysis of the Kennedy Education Bill of 1961. It also investigates the absence of any 
strategy to bridge the gulf between the administration and the federal aid interest groups, the 
Catholic Church, and Congress. Chapter V contains three sections: The first examines the 
failure of the 1961 Education Bill and how President Kennedy and his administration viewed 
that failure. The second section illustrates the effect the failed 1961 Education Bill had on the 
Kennedy Administration. There would be no general education bill proposed by the 
administration in 1962, but the beginning of a shift to advance a bill for aid to higher 
education. The third section focuses on the omnibus bill for 1963 which contained provisions 
for aid to public schools. Despite this, by 1963, the school aid provision had become a victim 
of the continuing religious question (aid to parochial schools) and the conflict over civil rights 
(aid to segregated schools). The 1963 federal aid to public schools also reflected the 
pragmatic concerns of the Kennedy Administration to pass anything regarding education. 
Finally, Chapter V offers final insights into the failure of the Kennedy Administration to secure 
federal aid to elementary and secondary education. Ultimately, the blame rests with President 
Kennedy for his unwillingness or inability to stand behind his promises and use his popularity 
to advance the public school aid cause. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans have regarded education as the keystone of the American democratic 
experience. Indeed, federal involvement in education pre-dates the Constitution. It was 
explicitly encouraged by the Congress of the Confederation in the Survey Ordinance of 
1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Beginning with the admission of Ohio in 
1802, the federal government adopted the Northwest Ordinance policy to the region's 
new states, allocating land for the support of public schools. Federal assistance was 
extended to higher education by the Morrill Act of 1862 and was further reinforced in 
1890 by the Second Morrill Act, the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, and the Smith-Hughes Act 
of 1917. These laws funded the new land-grant colleges for the expansion of agricultural 
curriculum and provided for mechanical-vocational training and home economics 
programs in high schools. The Second World War brought the "impacted" aid of the 
Lanham Act of 1940 for school districts overburdened by non-taxed military installations, 
and the G.I. Bill was passed in 1944. The Cold War brought about the National Science 
Foundation Act of 1950 and, in response to Sputnik, the National Defense Education Act 
of 1958 (NDEA). These were established to stimulate education in science, engineering, 
foreign languages, and mathematics. The federal government was clearly willing to 
provide categorical aid in times of national crisis. But attempts to enact more general aid 
programs became a hostage of constitutional objections, the church-state issue, fear of 
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local control, partisan disputes, and in the 1950s, the controversy over school 
desegregation. 
When John F. Kennedy entered the White House on January 20, 1961, he 
believed the nation had reached a consensus on domestic politics. Kennedy shared with 
a majority of the public and the Congress, as well as several major educational groups, 
the desire for federal financial assistance to the nation's schools, colleges, and 
universities. Yet at the time of his death, two years, ten months later, his administration 
had failed to secure such aid. The procedural, religious, and racial considerations 
acquired such visibility so as to render federal aid a non-educational issue. 
This study provides a political biography of John F. Kennedy and education. In 
addition, it investigates the records of past presidents and congresses, as well as the 
school aid lobby. This account also draws upon the vast body of historical, educational, 
and political material on John Kennedy. Chapter I traces Kennedy's record on federal 
aid as a Congressman (1947-1953) and Senator (1953-1960). Chapter II focuses on the 
role federal aid to education played during the 1960 presidential campaign. The chapter 
will examine the statements of both candidates and party platforms regarding the future 
role of the federal government in education. In addition, the history and role of the 
National Education Association in past presidential administrations will be discussed. 
Chapter Ill examines the "New Frontier'' and Kennedy's use of the Hovde Task Force on 
Education to define policies for the new administration. The approach of previous 
presidential administrations is examined and the model which John Kennedy chose to 
follow. Chapter Ill provides an analysis of Kennedy's successful attempt to enlarge the 
House Rules Committee. An early test for Kennedy, it proved to be a costly victory for 
the new administration. Chapter IV offers a critical analysis of the Kennedy Education Bill 
3 
of 1961 . It also investigates the absence of any strategy to bridge the gulf between the 
administration and the federal aid interest groups, the Catholic Church, and Congress. 
Chapter V contains three sections: The first examines the failure of the 1961 Education 
Bill and how President Kennedy and his administration viewed that failure. The second 
section illustrates the effect the failed 1961 Education Bill had on the Kennedy 
Administration. There would be no general education bill proposed by the administration 
in 1962, but the beginning of a shift to advance a bill for aid to higher education. The 
third section focuses on the omnibus bill for 1963 which contained provisions for aid to 
public schools. Despite this, by 1963, the school aid provision had become a victim of 
the continuing religious question (aid to parochial schools) and the conflict over civil 
rights (aid to segregated schools). The 1963 federal aid to public schools also reflected 
the pragmatic concerns of the Kennedy Administration to pass anything regarding 
education. Finally, Chapter V offers final insights into the failure of the Kennedy 
Administration to secure federal aid to elementary and secondary education. Ultimately, 
the blame rests with President Kennedy for his inability to provide the determined and 
forceful leadership to advance the public school aid cause. 
JFK--HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1946-1952) 
Leadership on federal aid would be an unfamiliar position for John Kennedy. Prior 
to Kennedy's decision to run for the Presidency, other legislators had seized the initiative 
on educational issues. From the struggles of an undistinguished academic career and 
an uneven legislative performance, Kennedy cultivated the dedication to educational 
opportunity in his march to the White House. 
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Twenty-nine year old John Kennedy won election to the House of Representatives 
in 1946 in what has been described as a "crazy quilt district mainly consisting of Irish and 
Italians living in eleven wards of Cambridge, three wards of Somerville, and one ward of 
Brighton, Charleston, Boston, and East Boston. "1 Kennedy entered Congress as a 
member of the minority party: the Republicans won control of both houses. Kennedy 
became a member of the Education and Labor Committee. This assignment, while 
unusual for a freshman, was the consequence of no great lobbying effort by Kennedy. 
His selection came without his "trying very hard, or thinking much about it, or without 
knowing too much about the subject. ... "2 The Kennedy appointment did not stem from 
any exceptional devotion to education in his campaign. Kennedy's 1946 platform called 
housing the most pressing issue. There was no mention of education. 3 
Congressman Kennedy approached the issue of federal aid to education 
cautiously, suggesting "first, that there must be a clear demonstration of actual need for 
such aid and this need finally having been demonstrated . . . that all children should 
derive some benefit."4 In a WMEX radio forum in Boston, April 12, 1947, Kennedy 
explained: 
I favor federal aid. I oppose federal control. By federal 
control I mean any federal action whatsoever with respect 
to the curriculum ... or the selection of teachers ... or the 
conditions under which schools shall be operated. . . . I 
1Joan and Clay Blair, Jr., The Search for JFK (Boston, Putnam and Sons, 1976), pp. 
424-425. 
2James MacGregor Burns, John Kennedy: A Political Profile (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Co., 1959), p. 24. 
31946 Kennedy Campaign Platform, Pre-Presidential Papers, House Files, 1946, 1952 
Campaign Files, Box 98, JFK Papers, JFKL. 
4"Reardon's 1952 Compilation," Personal Papers, Box 1, JFK Papers, JFKL. 
am not greatly disturbed by the argument that federal aid 
means federal control. 5 
5 
Representative Kennedy was one of four Democrats on the ten-member 
Subcommittee Number One, on Measures Relating to Education Generally, chaired by 
Republican Edward Mccowen of Ohio. The subcommittee held hearings on thirteen bills 
dealing with federal aid to education during April and May of 1947.6 Many of the 
measures were similar and were merely presented to indicate a strong backing for federal 
aid in principle. Others were presented because an individual felt aid should be given 
in a particular way or meet a specific need. Some of these proposals were given careful 
consideration, while others were not even read. 
Of all these measures, the two most important were S.472 and H.R. 2953. 
Senator Robert Taft was the leading sponsor of the former, and Chairman Mccowen 
submitted the latter. These bills were very similar. Each provided a minimum annual 
expenditure of forty dollars for each student. The bills also included provisions designed 
to prevent federal control of state school systems. In so doing, they intentionally passed 
the decision concerning aid to parochial schools on to the states. Both of these 
proposals contained the necessary ingredients for an eventual law. They provided 
money which was needed, and at the same time avoided many of the controversial 
issues which had defeated previous attempts at such legislation. 
5lbid, p. 44. 
6John Muncie, "The Struggle to Obtain Federal Aid for Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, 1940-1965" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Kent State University, 1969), p. 72. 
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The Senate subcommittee voted unanimously to bring out a bill for federal aid 
during that session. S.472, with an amendment raising the minimum expenditure per 
child to $50, was reported to the Senate on July 3, 1947.7 
Action was not so positive in the House subcommittee. On May 15th, Chairman 
Mccowen denied rumors that aid to education was to be killed on orders from 
Republican leadership. 8 Whether orders were given to kill the bill or not, no aid bill was 
reported out of the House subcommittee during the first session of the Eightieth 
Congress. 
These hearings are memorable for their exposition of Kennedy's views on aid to 
parochial schools. The testimony of Rev. William E. McManus, Assistant Director of the 
Department of Education of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, provided Kennedy 
with a political opportunity which he quickly seized. McManus' statements reflected the 
NCWC position of cautious support for federal aid, conditioned by equity among the 
states and, as was constitutionally permissible, between public and non-public schools.9 
Congressman Kennedy, representative of a predominantly Catholic district, could not 
oppose the argument of his church's hierarchy. Yet for those non-Catholics in his district, 
he asserted some autonomy by differing with McManus' argument that only the poorer 
states, and not Massachusetts, needed federal help. "Is it not a fact,• asked Kennedy, 
7Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, Vol. XClll, p. 8205. 
8Muncie, p. 82. 
9Lawrence John McAndrews, "Broken Ground: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of 
Education," Volumes I and II (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 
1985)' p. 40. 
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"that some of the states such as Massachusetts are having a difficult time financing their 
school systems?1110 
Later in the day, Kennedy's response to the testimony of Sarah Walsh of the 
National Teachers Division of the Congress of Industrial Organizations reinforced his 
support of flat educational grants to rich and poor states alike. "I question whether we 
as a wealthy state can afford to give much of our money to the Southern states when we 
ourselves are being truced heavily," said Kennedy. He suggested," ... if we are going to 
give our money then we should have the right to insist that other states ta>c certainly the 
equivalent of what Massachusetts does. "11 
Kennedy's statements regarding the church on the equalization question did not 
satisfy everyone. Elmer E. Rogers, Associate Editor of the Scottish Rite Publications, 
testified against any federal aid to parochial schools. He also claimed that Catholic 
parents faced excommunication if they did not send their children to these institutions. 
Kennedy replied, "I never went to a parochial school. I am a Catholic and yet my parents 
were never debarred from the sacrament, so the statement is wrong." When Rogers 
contended that an American Catholic's allegiance to the Vatican preceded his loyalty to 
his country, Kennedy angrily replied: "I think that when you make such statements and 
charges, you should know what you are talking about. . . . There is an old saying in 
Boston that 'We get our religion from Rome and our politics at home"'12 
10"Federal Aid to Education: Hearings Before Subcommittee Number One of the 
Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives," Soth Congress, 1st 
Session, April 29-May 29, 1947, p. 169. 
11 lbid, p. 169. 
12lbid, p. 169. 
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This particular witness had been somewhat discredited and the force taken from 
his testimony. It would not be such a simple matter to dismiss the strength of the 
pressure groups behind such men. These hearings served as Kennedy's indoctrination 
in the religious issue, which would never leave the education debate, or Kennedy himself. 
Though the "do nothing" Congress lived up to its reputation in the field of 
education, Congressman Kennedy had provided a glimpse of positions he had not 
previously felt compelled to take. He pronounced himself on the side of federal aid to 
public elementary and secondary education. He considered the notion of individual tax 
reductions for educational expenses. He favored federal assistance to parochial schools. 
He expressed misgivings about allocating federal funds to help pay the salaries of public 
school teachers. 
Kennedy easily gained reelection to the House in 1948. He returned to find it a 
different place as the Democratic Party had recaptured the Congress. The Democratic 
victory brought many new faces to Washington, thus increasing the stature of incumbent 
Democrats. In 1949, Kennedy capitalized on this situation by introducing his first and 
only education bill as a member of the House of Representatives. H.R. 5838 authorized 
$300,000,000 a year of federal aid to the states for "any current educational expense of 
the state school system."13 A separate title of the bill would set aside ten percent of 
each state's allotment for auxiliary services such as bus transportation, health services, 
textbooks for private and parochial schools. 
Kennedy based his proposal on the "child benefit" theory which the Supreme 
Court had ruled in the Everson case in 1946. This theory holds, "while the Constitution 
prohibits direct federal aid to non-public schools, it permits assistance in the form of 
13"Reardon's 1952 Compilation," Box 1, Personal Papers, JFKL. 
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public welfare benefits to children of those schools."14 Kennedy emphasized the 
provision of the bill which "makes it possible for the government to enter into contracts 
with those schools to reimburse them for fifty percent of their actual expenses incurred 
in supplying these services."15 
The Kennedy bill was a reaction to legislation proposed by Education 
Subcommittee Chairman Graham Barden, Democrat, from North Carolina. The Barden 
bill had been a response to the Thomas bill which had passed the Senate. The bill 
contained three items which were unacceptable to Kennedy. First, it called for federal 
aid to all states with no requirement that the poor states make a greater effort to improve 
their educational establishments. Second, it prohibited any form of federal aid to 
parochial schools. Third, it permitted federal expenditures for racially segregated 
schools. 
The Kennedy bill was a popular "gesture . . . but was clearly doomed in a 
chamber and also a committee that had been historically hostile to federal aid to 
education."16 Not surprisingly, the Kennedy bill died in committee when the first session 
of the Eighty-First Congress adjourned. 
At the outset of the second House session in 1950, Kennedy took a different tack. 
With the help of Education and Labor Committee chairman John Lesinski and the U.S. 
Office of Education, he devised an amendment to the Senate bill. It provided that in 
states whose constitutions permitted such expenditures, a portion of federal education 
14McAndrews, p. 44. 
15lbid, p. 45. 
16Hugh Davis Graham, The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the 
Kennedy and Johnson Years (University of North Carolina Press, 1984), p. 4. 
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funds would pay the cost of transportation of nonpublic school pupils. In those states 
which prohibited the use of funds, the Office of Education would finance not more than 
fifty percent of the transportation expenses. On March 7, 1950, the amendment lost by 
a 16-9 committee vote. 17 
On March 18, 1950, the Boston Pilot, the newspaper of the Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of Boston, hailed the brave efforts of its Congressman. Despite Kennedy's 
unsuccessful three-year campaign for federally funded "auxiliary services," for non-public 
school students, the Pilot concluded he stood "as a white knight against the crepuscular 
haze."18 
Congressman Kennedy had four opportunities to vote on education issues on the 
floor of the House. In 1950, Kennedy was in the majority which passed the impacted 
area aid bills which became Public Laws 815 and 874, the Housing Act which provided 
the loans for college housing construction, and the bill which created the National 
Science Foundation to promote research and scientific education. That same year, 
however, Kennedy was in the minority in voting to recommit a public service 
demonstration act which provided $163 million to the states for library services. "The true 
function of the National Government,• said Kennedy in the floor debate, "is to do what the 
people in the various states cannot do themselves. There is no state in the Union that 
cannot afford to pay $40,000 a year for library services."19 Interestingly, none of 
Kennedy's biographers make an assessment of his votes during the 1950 legislative 
session of Congress. 
17"Reardon's 1952 Compilation," Box 1, Personal Papers, JFKL, pp. 49-50. 
18"Reardon's 1952 Compilation," Box 1, Personal Papers, JFKL. 
19Congressional Record, March 9, 1950, p. 3129. 
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JFK--THE SENATE (1953-1960) 
Kennedy was elected to the Senate in 1952, following a tough race with Henry 
Cabot Lodge. The campaign focused primarily on state and local issues and therefore 
paid little attention to federal aid to education. The campaign also marked a transition 
from Kennedy's previous political campaigns. Kennedy's Senate campaign saw the 
emergency of Lawrence O'Brien's organizational abilities which would prove to be crucial 
in future campaigns. But the most important was the emergence of Robert Kennedy 
whose energy, organizational ability, and loyalty proved invaluable. After entering the 
Senate, Kennedy would be joined by Ted Sorensen, whose contributions would help 
shape future Kennedy domestic legislative proposals. 
Senator Kennedy was appointed to the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, 
which handled educational legislation. The bitterness from the 1950 House Education 
and Labor Committee rejection of federal aid legislation, the Korean War emergency, the 
actions of Senator Joseph McCarthy, and the election of a Republican President and 
Congress combined to keep education issues in the background of the Eighty-Third 
Congress. 
A proposal to use oil for education as a way to bring federal aid through the side 
door, met with Kennedy's approval, but Congressional defeat. He urged the federal 
government to use money from off-shore oil for the construction of schools and hospitals, 
a position generally led in the Senate by Lister Hill of Alabama. On April 27, 1953, 
Kennedy voted with the minority against a motion by Senator Robert Taft to table a bill 
providing for federal control of submerged lands past three miles; joint federal-state 
control up to three miles; and use of federal resources for offshore oil to aid education. 
On May 5, Kennedy backed the losing Lehman Amendment giving federal control of 
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submerged lands and resources in the Continental Shelf, with the revenues earmarked 
for education. He also supported the unsuccessful Neely Amendment which called for 
federal control over the same lands, with education sharing the income with disabled 
veterans benefits and the reduction of the national debt. On June 24th, Kennedy co-
sponsored a bill which directed Continental Shelf receipts first to national defense and 
then to education. The measure passed the Senate, but when the Senate-House 
conference committee eliminated the education provision, Kennedy voted no in a losing 
cause. Kennedy resurrected the oil-for-education concept on April 1 , 1954, but it died 
in the Interior Committee. 20 
In a letter to the President dated April 1, 1953, Kennedy protested the Eisenhower 
Administration's proposed $75 million reduction in the school lunch program. While 
"sympathetic to all reasonable attempts ... to effect economy in government," wrote 
Senator Kennedy," ... I do feel that ... general across-the-board cuts in funds in such 
a vital area as this lunch program are ill-advised. •21 Kennedy also co-sponsored a 
school construction bill which emerged from the Labor and Public Welfare Committee of 
July 9, 1954, but never came to a floor vote. 
!he election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Presidency in 1952 had signalled a 
change in American politics--" a return, in effect, to the Republican 'normalcy' after twenty 
years of Democratic activism. "22 By 1956, a new generation of Democrats led by Adlai 
Stevenson were preparing to claim national recognition. A new postwar brand of political 
20McAndrews, p. 51. 
21 Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1967, Appendix, p. A. 
22Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1965), p. 14. 
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leadership was beginning to emerge with Kennedy in the vanguard. A new generation 
Democrat, he was burdened neither by strong partisanship nor identifications with past 
policies. John Kennedy had been one of its first members to enter politics. Kennedy's 
bid for the vice-presidential nomination at the 1956 Democratic National Convention 
brought him for the first time toward the center of national consciousness. Campaigning 
for his party took Kennedy to 140 public appearances in twenty-six states that year. 
Though narrowly losing the vice-presidential nomination to Estes Kefauver, "it became 
increasingly clear that the vice-presidential nomination would not satisfy him the next time 
around."23 He returned to the Senate reveling in the excitement of media speculation, 
but also determined to win reelection to a second term in 1958. 
On January 28, 1958, Senator Kennedy introduced a $300 million, five year school 
construction program. It was a program with matching grants focusing on these areas 
with critical classroom shortages. The funds would be distributed "according to each 
state's school-age population, with supplemental federal loans to school financing 
agencies and federal purchase of school bonds."24 Kennedy criticized Eisenhower for 
"abandoning" school construction in his effort to pass the defense education bill. He also 
warned that the national classroom shortage, if ignored, would become "the major crisis 
facing education in the 1960's."25 He took the same position in an article in the NEA 
Journal in January 1958. The Kennedy proposal received, however, no consideration by 
the Labor and Public Welfare Committee. This was due primarily to a bill (S.3163) 
introduced by Republican Alexander Smith of New Jersey which sought to implement the 
23lbid, p. 19. 
24McAndrews, p. 53. 
25Congressional Record, January 28, 1958, p. 1158. 
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education proposals of the Eisenhower administration. By 1958, the President had given 
up recommending the program for school construction which he had advocated during 
the three previous years. The President, responding to the Soviet launching of Sputnik 
the previous October, along with the prior defeats of his program had shifted his 
emphasis to "areas of education closely related to national security."26 The National 
Defense Education Act, enacted in September of 1958, would become one of the 
Eisenhower administration's most noteworthy achievements. 
In the committee majority report on the defense education bill, Kennedy joined 
fellow Democrats Pat McNamara of Michigan, Wayne Morse of Oregon, and James 
Murray of Montana, along with Republican John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky in 
pleading for "a broad program of financial assistance to enable the states to attack their 
serious education problems at the primary and secondary level."27 This 
recommendation became the McNamara bill. It was a billion dollar, two year school 
construction amendment to the National Defense Education Act of 1958. The 
amendment was defeated by a 61-30 vote because many senators were afraid it would 
kill the defense education bill in the House. The NDEA, which Senate majority leader 
Lyndon Johnson proudly referred to as "an historic landmark . . . of this or any other 
session, "28 passed the Senate on August 13, 1958, with Kennedy on the winning side. 
In 1959, Pennsylvania Democrat Joseph Clark, along with co-sponsor Kennedy, 
26Muncie, p. 141. 
27"The Fate of the Nation," National Education Association Journal, XLVll, January 
1958, pp. 10-11. 
28"lndividual Views, National Defense Act of 1958, Report of the Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare, Senate," August 8, 1958, p. 48. 
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attempted to revive the construction amendment. It failed on September 14th of the 
same year. 
The passage of the National Defense Act raised the question of the role of federal 
aid to education. Born out of the Soviet launching of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, it 
forced a consensus that Soviet superiority in science and education should be matched 
by federal funding of higher education. Would the short-term assistance to higher 
education in a Cold War crisis generate momentum toward a permanent federal role in 
education? If so, how would such a role affect elementary and secondary schools. With 
the 1958 congressional by-elections bringing the Democrats 48 new seats in the House 
and 15 in the Senate, they were presented with an opportunity to embarrass the 
Eisenhower-Nixon administration and capture the White House in 1960. In a sense, the 
presidential campaign of 1960 "began when the Eighty-Sixth Congress convened on 
January 7, 1959, and an aid-to-education bill was to figure prominently in Democratic 
strategy. "29 
Kennedy supported Senator McNamara's two-year school construction program, 
which reached the floor of the Senate in February of 1960. Senator Clark offered an 
amendment to the bill authorizing the expenditure of federal funds for teacher salaries. 
A conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans on the House Rules 
Committee blocked a conference committee vote on the bill which President Eisenhower 
would have vetoed anyway. The result of this maneuvering forced Vice-President and 
certain GOP presidential nominee Richard Nixon to break the 44 to 44 tie in the Senate 
by voting against the amendment. As Hugh Davis Graham wrote, Nixon would thereby 
29Graham, p. 5. 
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"earn the enmity and the Democrats would earn the appreciation of the National 
Education Association's three-quarters-of-a-million voting teachers and their families."30 
Yet realizing that much of the opposition to his salary amendment was its expense 
and its permanence, Senator Clark reduced the price of the proposal to $20 per child 
and its duration to two years. A second Clark amendment, again calling for federal aid 
to teacher's salaries, passed 54-35. Kennedy supported both Clark amendments, but 
voted against an addition served by Clark and Wayne Morse to permit low-interest loans 
for non-public school construction. Kennedy explained his vote "arose as the result of 
a hastily drafted amendment which would only have added to the general confusion on 
the subject of civil rights .... Procedurally, it seemed like a vote in favor of segregated 
schools. "31 Kennedy was the only one of twelve Catholic senators to oppose the 
amendment. The House ruled the teachers' salaries and non-public school issues "non-
germane," thereby preventing a future vote. 
The years 1959-1960 also saw Kennedy co-sponsor legislation to provide tax 
breaks for the parents of college students and to establish a National Advisory 
Commission on Education. Kennedy, along with other federal aid partisans, watched as 
neither bill came to a vote. However, on August 13, 1959, Kennedy joined with the 
majority, which passed the Korean G.I. Bill extending educational benefits to men in 
military service between 1955 and 1963. 
Kennedy also became more outspoken on the issue of civil rights, even though 
Massachusetts had relatively few blacks. Kennedy supported Eisenhower's decision to 
301bid, p. 6. 
31 Letter from John F. Kennedy to Francis Reagan, March 3, 1960, Pre-Presidential 
Papers, Box 733, JFKL. 
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send federal troops to enforce school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957. 
He was among the Senate minority who voted to add Title Ill to the Civil Rights Act of 
1957. This enabled the Attorney General to "protect through injunctive relief, all civil 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution [including desegregated schools]."32 
In a speech at the 1959 convocation of the United Negro College Fund, Kennedy 
declared, "The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court five years ago tolled the end 
of the era of segregation facilities." In his remarks, Kennedy also sought to equate the 
problem of civil rights and education in America. The "Negro colleges and universities 
share the general crisis of American education at the same time they face a special crisis 
of their own. "33 
An examination of John Kennedy's career during these years shows a 
transformation in his position on education issues. Congressman Kennedy was devoted 
to his constituents and took a safe position on education issues. Despite his professed 
support for federal aid, he opposed the Barden general aid bill. His vote against tlie 
Burke Amendment demonstrated his resistance to federal aid for teachers' salaries. At 
the University of Notre Dame, January 29, 1950, Kennedy admonished the "ever-
expanding power of the federal government, the absorption of many of the functions that 
cities and states once considered to be responsibilities of their own."34 In a speech 
during his 1952 Senatorial campaign, Kennedy declared, "I can think of nothing of greater 
32"Record of John F. Kennedy on Civil Rights and Race Relations," Pre-Presidential 
Papers, 1960 Campaign Files, Box 1029, JFK Papers, JFKL. 
33Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy, 1959 Convocation of United Negro College 
Fund, Indianapolis, Indiana, April 12, 1959, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1960 Campaign Files, 
Box 1029, JFK Papers, JFKL. 
34"Commencement Address of John F. Kennedy at the University of Notre Dame," 
January 29, 1950, Pre-Presidential Papers, House files, Box 94, JFK Papers, JFKL. 
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concern ... than a reduction in the rate of government spending and ... the burden of 
Federal taxation."35 Such warnings of federal control were not the remarks of a 
champion of federal aid. Kennedy entered the Senate as a man associated with the 
cause of Catholic education rather than that of national education. 
It was in Senator Kennedy's first term that he sought a balance between 
constituent and interest group pressures and a national agenda. While it is not easy to 
separate the role of Senator from Presidential aspirant, there did emerge as one close 
observer of Kennedy's views on education noted, late in his second term many new 
positions on education which "seemed to owe at least as much to Presidential ambition 
as to Senatorial deliberation."36 
In 1950, Kennedy had opposed the enactment of the Library Services Act. A 
decade later, he sponsored a bill to extend it five years. The candidate who campaigned 
for a balanced budget in 1952, wrote of education legislation in 1958, ". . . this is one 
area in which we must not [be] obsessed with budget balancing."37 As a Representative 
and Senator, Kennedy had supported auxiliary seNices for non-public schools, but as a 
Presidential candidate, he contended the question should be decided on the basis of 
state and local laws. On the other hand, though, his initial opposition in the House 
against federal aid for teachers' salaries persisted until January 1960, when Senator 
Kennedy cast two votes for the Clark teacher's salaries amendments to the McNamara 
bill. 
35"Economy Speech," Pre-Presidential Papers, 1952 Campaign Files, Box 99, JFK 
Papers, JFKL. 
36McAndrews, p. 61 . 
37lbid, p. 62. 
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Kennedy also dropped his insistence on temporary federal aid. He had been 
initially apprehensive about a permanent federal role in education. In introducing his 
school construction bill in January, 1958, Kennedy announced "the emergency role of the 
federal government [in education] is a temporary one."38 As late as December, 1958, 
Senator Kennedy had resisted the appeals of the National Education Association to co-
sponsor the 1959 Murray-Metcalf permanent support bill. By 1960, presidential candidate 
Kennedy had changed his position, and his vote that year for the first Clark Amendment 
was the opening volley in his aggressive campaign for permanent federal support to 
education. 
Kennedy also made a swift, yet less dramatic alteration of his views on federal aid 
to higher education. In late 1958, Kennedy felt federal scholarships were not of the 
highest priority, while supporting only a limited number of such grants. By the 1960 
campaign, Kennedy had elevated scholarships to the same level as school construction. 
Why had Kennedy relinquished many of the positions he held as a Congressman 
and Senator? One possible answer is that Kennedy would have problems gathering 
liberal support in the Democratic Party convention of 1960. Also, by the late 1950s, 
Kennedy has moved closer to the positions of liberal senators on a number of issues, 
including welfare issues, civil rights, and civil liberties. In 1959, for example, he worked 
to secure the repeal of the National Defense Education Act clause requiring students to 
sign a loyalty oath if they wanted loans for college. Yet even some close friends and 
admirers believed that he did so to remove the taint of his earlier conduct regarding Joe 
38Congressional Record, January 28, 1958. 
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McCarthy, the notorious anti-Communist crusader. It became, as Kennedy's pre-
presidential biographer, James MacGregor Burns, wrote, "the issue that would not die."39 
Kennedy's previous actions regarding Senator McCarthy were mixed. He had 
voted both for and against funds for McCarthy's investigative activities and had taken no 
political stand. Family pressures remained strong against Kennedy tangling with 
McCarthy. After John's election to the Senate, his brother Robert went to work for 
McCarthy's committee as chief counsel. John remarked that he could not "holler about 
what McCarthy had done in 1952 or 1951 when my brother had been on the staff in 
1953. That is really the guts of the matter. "40 And, unquestionably, Joseph P. Kennedy 
was opposed to his son's participation in any kind of censure move. 
In 1954, when the Senate was considering whether to censure McCarthy, Kennedy 
was recovering from near fatal back surgery in New York. As Kennedy biographer 
Herbert Parmet has written, "cynics would always suspect the timing of Jack Kennedy's 
entrance to the New York Hospital for Special Surgery."41 Many felt that the large 
McCarthy following in Massachusetts would allow Kennedy to "choose the particular 
moment of the McCarthy debate to be hospitalized."42 Although unable, physically, to 
vote on the final censure, Kennedy had not made the flat denunciation of McCarthy that 
liberals demanded. Burns concludes that the McCarthy era "may have contributed to the 
maturing and deepening of Kennedy's own liberalism. But if so, neither he nor the 
39Burns, p. 131. 
401bid, p. 152. 
41 Parmet, p. 307. 
42lbid, p. 308. 
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liberals would admit to it."43 By July 1960, Kennedy, who seven years earlier had urged 
his party to "seize the middle of the road," held positions on education mirroring those 
of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action. 
Despite his many changes of position, John Kennedy's attraction to education 
issues remained constant throughout his congressional career. While not being a 
creative legislator, he served on committees charged with oversight of educational issues 
in both houses and the Education Subcommittee in the House. Though seldom a 
participant in floor debate, he introduced or co-sponsored significant education 
legislation. Education would become an issue in the 1960 election because Kennedy felt 
it was important. In addition, historically the Democratic Party had responded to the 
pressure for aid to education, while the Republican Party had been slow to respond. 
43Burns, p. 154. 
CHAPTER II 
EDUCATION AS AN ISSUE IN THE 1960 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
As a presidential candidate, John Kennedy brought unprecedented visibility to the 
issue of education. His religion was responsible for much of this attention. In a March 
3, 1959, interview with Look magazine, Senator Kennedy asserted, "There can be no 
question of federal funds being used for support of parochial or private schools. It's 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 111 The 
only possible exception to his position involved such "fringe matters as buses, lunches, 
and other services" where the issue was primarily social and economic, not religious. In 
the case of these auxiliary services, he suggested each problem should be judged on its 
merits within the interpretation of the Supreme Court. 
Kennedy had hoped to ignore the religious issue during the primaries. However, 
continued skepticism threatened the credibility of the Kennedy arguments. More 
troublesome for him was opposition from the clergy itself. While getting him elected 
"seemed a test of religious toleration, others within the Church felt that a Catholic in the 
presidency could do less to help their interest than would a Protestant. "2 Also, many 
prelates, among them Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York and James Cardinal 
Mcintyre of Los Angeles, were simply too conservative to accept Kennedy. This 
1"Democratic Forecast: A Catholic in 1960" Look XXlll (March 3, 1959), p. 17. 
2Herbert Parmet, JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Penguin Books, 1984), p. 
38. 
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prompted Kennedy's celebrated comment: "Now I understand why Henry VIII set up his 
own church. "3 
Even Kennedy's victory in Wisconsin did not reduce his anxieties about the 
religious issue. The voting had been along Catholic-Protestant, as well as urban-rural, 
lines. Kennedy's candidacy had, indeed, provoked a flare-up of religious controversy in 
Midwestern America. This made the West Virginia primary crucial. It did so as Catholics 
accounted for just three percent of the population. Religion was important in West 
Virginia. Fundamentalism had strong roots among the people of a state impoverished 
by the decline of the coal industry. Kennedy's 61 percent of the popular vote and sweep 
of 48 of West Virginia's 55 counties convinced Hubert Humphrey to withdraw as an active 
challenger. It also became the best evidence that Catholicism would not necessarily be 
fatal to Kennedy's chances for the nomination. 
Kennedy was able to counter the fear about religion through major speeches and 
television appearances. This aspect of the campaign was highlighted by his appearance 
on the eve of his primary victory. Very effectively, he declared, "When any man stands 
on the steps of the capitol and takes the oath of office as President, he is swearing to 
support the separation of church and state. "4 
The most forceful campaign statement on the religious issue came on September 
12, 1960, at the Houston Ministerial Association. Speaking before a group of somewhat 
hostile and skeptical Protestant clergy, Kennedy reaffirmed his belief in a constitutional 
presidency, closing with a pledge to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution."5 
3Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (Harper and Row, 1965), p. 148. 
4Theodore White, The Making of the President, 1960 (Atheneum, 1961), p. 107. 
5Parmet, p. 46. 
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In his ten and a half minute address, Kennedy also stated his opposition to aid 
for parochial schools. He declared his belief in an America where the "separation of 
church and state is absolute ... where no church or church school is granted any public 
funds or political preference. "6 In response to a reporter's question later in the 
campaign, he completely wrote off aid to non-public schools by saying, "The principle of 
church-state separation precludes aid to parochial schools, and private schools enjoy the 
abundant resources of private enterprises. "7 
Kennedy's strong support of federal aid to public education would prove difficult 
in transcending the religious controversy. When Kennedy announced his candidacy at 
a press conference on January 2, 1960, he listed six main issues; the rebuilding of 
American science and education were listed third, behind the arms race and order in the 
emerging nations. 8 
The 1960 Democratic party platform plank on education provided for "generous 
federal financial support" consisting of "federal grants to states for educational purposes 
. . . including classroom construction and teachers' salaries. •9 The platform also 
mandated a "program of loans and scholarship grants" and "aid for the construction of 
6The Speeches of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Campaign of 1960, Report of the 
Commerce Committee, U.S. Senate 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1961 ), p. 208. 
7New York Herald Tribune, September 25, 1960. 
8New York Times, January 3, 1960. 
9Kirk H. Proter and Donald Bruce, eds. National Party Platforms 1840-1968 (Urbana, 
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 590. 
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academic facilities as well as dormitories at colleges and universities."10 James 
Sundquist, a member of the 1960 Democratic National Platform Committee, stated: 
Kennedy took the platform more seriously than most other 
members of the party; he did feel that he was running on 
that platform . . . [and] while it promised too much, it 
promised very little that President Kennedy did not try to 
deliver on.,, 
Kennedy and Nixon were nominated by their respective party conventions in July, 
1960. Their campaigns were largely dominated by Cold War posturing. However, on 
domestic issues, Kennedy raised the education issue often. In a September speech in 
Oregon, Kennedy stated that education was "the issue of this campaign." He called 
education legislation "the most important subject that we have," linking it to "a strong and 
democratic society.•12 
In an October, 1960, Scholastic Teacher questionnaire, Kennedy advocated the 
expenditure of federal funds for classroom construction and teachers's salaries. These 
funds would be allocated to the states based on each state's student population. He 
opposed the withholding of federal education funds from segregated schools. He also 
supported the establishment of a federal college scholarship program. 13 
In a special article for the National Education Association Journal entitled "Kennedy 
Says," he declared the United States faced "a crisis in education." Employing Cold War 
10lbid, p. 590. 
11Transcript, "James Sundquist Oral History Interview," September 13, 1965, JFKL, p. 
9. 
12"The Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences, and Statements of Senator John F. 
Kennedy, August 1 through November 7, 1960," Senate Report 994, 1961, p. 147. 
13"Nixon vs. Kennedy: Federal Aid to Education," Scholastic Teacher Supplement, 
Senior Scholastic 77(October19, 1960), pp. 1T-3T. 
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rhetoric, he explained the "issue is one of national survival, with civilization a race 
between education and catastrophe."14 In the same issue, under the title "Nixon Says," 
Nixon argued "federal education, if applied in the wrong way [would] impose a barrier in 
the form of rigid central controls over ... what is taught."15 He criticized Democratic 
fiscal policy by stating, "The criteria ... is not simply the amount of money we spend; it 
is how we spend it and toward what goal. "16 
Throughout the campaign, Kennedy also criticized Nixon for casting the tie-
breaking vote which defeated the Democratic bill for increasing teachers' salaries. In an 
October speech in Minnesota, Kennedy accused Nixon of promising "us better schools 
and salaries for our teachers ... but this year. . . . Mr. Nixon cast the deciding vote .. 
. against [the] Federal aid."17 In a speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, Kennedy criticized 
Nixon for making Federal aid to education a "false issue." Kennedy argued, "Federal aid 
to education is nothing new . . . the U.S. Office of Education is already spending 
hundreds of millions to aid local education . . . and the Federal Government has not 
sought to impose any unreasonable demands."18 
Late in the campaign, on a national telethon, Nixon was asked about his tie-
breaking vote. He explained it as "a key vote ... showing the difference in philosophy" 
14"Kennedy Says," National Education Association Journal (October 1960), p. 10. 
15"Nixon Says," National Education Association Journal (October 1960), p. 11. 
16lbid, p. 11. 
17"The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy," Senate Report 994, 1961, p. 427. 
18"The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy," Senate Report 994, 1961, p. 1126. 
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between Kennedy and himself. 19 Nixon stated while he felt strongly about teachers' 
salaries, having "the Federal Government subsidizing our teachers . . . is inviting the 
Federal Government to control what teachers teach.• Nixon felt this must not happen 
"because the essence of freedom is education ... and the moment you have the Federal 
Government controlling centrally what is taught . . . you are on the road to the loss of 
freedom.•20 
Throughout the campaign, Nixon criticized Kennedy's education proposals as •a 
great big Government program." Nixon charged Kennedy with not giving the people a 
choice. It was not "the American way [to allow] the people in Washington ... to set up 
huge programs in education, [to] ... take care of the people." Nixon told a crowd of 
supporters, "It sounds good ... [but] it won't work."21 
The Kennedy forces had addressed Republican objections in a September 19, 
1960, briefing paper. Describing the teacher as "the heart of the educative process," the 
paper urged "dramatically higher salaries" as the "real key to getting and keeping quality 
teachers. "22 The increase would not be possible without "substantial federal assistance." 
Stressing "freedom of choice," candidate Kennedy would give local school systems ihe 
freedom to make their decisions about how much money would go for teachers' salaries 
... and how much for construction of new classrooms."23 In a campaign speech in Los 
19"The Speeches of Vice President Richard M. Nixon," Senate Report 994, 1961, p. 
1099. 
201bid, p. 1100. 
21 lbid, p. 824. 
22"Salaries (Education)," Democratic National Committee, Box 195, Education folder 
(September 1, 1960 - September 2, 1960), JFKL. 
231bid. 
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Angeles, Kennedy reiterated "our commitment to complete local control of our school 
systems." Kennedy argued, "All Democratic bills . . . provide that the money shall be 
given to the states for distribution . . . yet the Republicans have opposed virtually every 
Democratic effort."24 
On September 25, the eve of the first "debate," Nixon released his study paper on 
education. It revealed a comprehensive program of federal aid, although it did not 
contain any dollar amounts. For elementary and secondary education, he proposed a 
program of debt-servicing and matching grants that would relieve state and local 
governments of construction costs. This would, "first in importance," release their funds 
"for urgent increases in teachers' pay . . . and we will do it without menacing the . . . 
freedom of our schools by inhibiting Federal control."25 For higher education, Nixon 
called for a "greatly expanded" program of matching grants for the construction of 
classrooms, laboratories, and libraries. He also supported tuition tax credits for higher 
education. 
During the remainder of the campaign, Kennedy criticized Nixon's study paper on 
education. In an October speech in Illinois, Kennedy declared Nixon's "campaign 
position paper . . . supports Federal grants to school districts burdened by Federal 
employees or installations--but as a Senator he voted to cut the heart out of these funds." 
Kennedy charged Nixon with having "never said a word" when the bill for college 
classrooms and dormitories was "twice passed by the Democrats and twice vetoed by 
the Republicans." Kennedy also stated when the battle for "matching grants to private 
24"The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy, Presidential Campaign of 1960," Senate 
Report 994, December 1961 , p. 1234. 
25"The Speeches of Vice-President Richard M. Nixon," Senate Report 994, 1961, p. 
283. 
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colleges and universities was being waged, [Nixon] termed such a program as 
undesirable. "26 
Nixon's education program appeared to have softened the edge of Kennedy's 
attack, but Kennedy kept pressing his appeal for federal aid for construction and 
teachers' salaries. This helped to secure an informal endorsement from the National 
Education Association. Their literature during the fall of 1960 made it clear the 
"Democratic presidential candidate's stand on federal aid was in agreement with NEA 
policy, while the Republican's was not."27 
The National Education Association was born in 1857 as a Congressionally 
chartered study group of college officials, school superintendents, and teachers. NEA 
membership consisted of primarily conservative, rural, middle-class white Protestants 
from the South and West.28 In the nineteenth century, the association adopted a 
cautious stance, urging a greater federal responsibility in education but warning against 
federal control. 
During the early twentieth century, the NEA grew from a study group to a 
professional organization which represented teachers in employment issues. 
Membership swelled in the wake of its nationwide survey of teachers' salaries in 1905 
and a subsequent successful campaign for teacher tenure, retirement, and salary 
26The Speeches of John F. Kennedy, p. 742. 
27Frank J. Munger and Richard Fenno, National Politics and Federal Aid to Education, 
Syracuse University Press, 1962, p. 183. 
28Gilbert Elliot Smith, "The Limits of Reform: Politics and Federal Aid to Education 
1937-1950," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1975), p .. 16. 
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improvement laws.29 In 1920, the NEA inaugurated its Congressional lobbying unit, the 
Legislative Commission. 
The New Deal period featured the acceleration of two significant developments 
within the NEA: the increased sophistication of its lobbying and public relations 
techniques, and the growing domination of the organization by school superintendents. 
The NEA Journal published studies conducted by the organization's Research 
Commission which bolstered the argument for federal aid. Gilbert E. Smith, the leading 
student of federal aid to education during this era, describes the NEA as finding itself "in 
the awkward position of being an organization with Republican sympathies needing 
Democratic support to get a liberal administration to agree to a rather moderate 
legislative proposal. •30 
By the end of World War II, the NEA's position on federal aid had evolved to 
reflect changing realities. The successes and popularity of the New Deal experiment in 
large-scale federal involvement in social welfare matters helped diminish NEA 
apprehension of the hazards of federal control. Wartime dislocations and the postwar 
"baby boom" focused widespread attention on classroom and teacher shortages. 
Throughout the Truman Administration, the NEA worked with unprecedented 
visibility and resources to secure federal aid to wealthy and poor states alike. Truman's 
secretary, William D. Hassett, estimated that an NEA federal aid letter-writing campaign 
had spawned four thousand communications to the President by January of 1949.31 
29Henry Citron, "The Study of the Arguments of Interest Groups Which Opposed 
Federal Aid to Education from 1949-1965," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, New York 
University, 1977), p. 47. 
30Smith, p. 379. 
31 Muncie, p. 105. 
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By 1950, the support of prominent Republican Robert Taft, who had attacked federal aid 
in a 1941 address to the NEA, to the federal aid cause marked a major triumph for the 
organization. "When Taft changed his opinion about federal aid to education," writes 
former NEA official William Carr, "the issue could no longer be discussed as though it 
were solely a matter of political partisanship. "32 
The euphoria created within the NEA by the Taft decision produced a new 
flexibility in the association's church-state stand, as the NEA wanted nothing to jeopardize 
its opportunity for federal aid. The Taft-Thomas-Hill proposal of 1947, S.246, established 
a minimum annual expenditure of forty dollars for each student and left the allocation of 
these federal funds to the states. The states could, ·therefore, distribute some of the 
funds to nonpublic schools. The NEA muted its opposition to such assistance, and the 
bill passed the Senate. 
But North Carolina Representative Graham Barden's transformation of S.246 into 
his own public school-only bill in the House Education Subcommittee put the NEA's new 
flexibility to the test. While not relinquishing its support of S.246, the NEA nonetheless 
indicated it would back the Barden substitute. The NEA's retreat from S.246 became 
official when, at its 1947 convention, it voted down a resolution calling for the support of 
"federal aid for transportation and services made available for public and nonpublic 
schools.•33 
NEA policy during the Eisenhower era consisted of two major features: a dislike 
for the Administration's piecemeal approach to federal aid, yet pragmatic approval of the 
32William G. Carr, The Continuing Education of William Carr: An Autobiography, 
(Washington: National Education Association, 1978), p. 300. 
33McAndrews, p. 73. 
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legislative strategy. The NEA leadership repeatedly chided Eisenhower for failure to 
intervene in the crucial House votes on federal aid to legislation. 
Despite its misgivings about the tenacity of Eisenhower's commitment to 
education, the NEA exhibited unusual patience throughout much of his presidency. The 
NEA, an organization overwhelmingly composed of teachers, sacrificed its previous call 
for aid to teachers' salaries on the political bargaining table. The NEA "tried to make a 
virtue of necessity,• in Carr's words, in backing the unsuccessful Kelly construction bill 
of 1956.34 In the 1957 Congressional session, the NEA supported construction-only 
legislation, which again died in the House. Ultimately, the NEA found refuge from the 
troublesome questions of teachers' salaries, permanent support, race, and religion in the 
construction-only legislation which characterized much of the decade.35 
Public attention became directed to the so-called "great debates," which created 
a new precedent for presidential politics. While most of the debates focused on 
international issues, the first two did address education. In the first encounter, Kennedy 
blamed Congress' failure to pass the educational legislation on President Eisenhower and 
the Republican members of the House Rules Committee. Kennedy stated, "It's extremely 
difficult . . . to pass any bill when the President is opposed." It was also "the Rules 
341bid, p. 75. 
35Historians of the 1960 campaign place less emphasis on federal aid to public 
education as an issue than the religious controversy or foreign affairs. The standard 
authority on the campaign is Theodore H. White's "The Making of the President 1960." 
White is stronger on personality and mood than he is on the issues. He also misses the 
education issue almost entirely. The two "Kennedy-insider'' biographies by Theodore 
Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger focus primarily on Kennedy's efforts to overcome the 
opposition of the Catholic hierarchy and the House Rules Committee. In "The Uncertain 
Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Years," Hugh Davis 
Graham provides a skillful analysis of the campaign and the debates. In the most recent 
appraisal of the Kennedy presidency, "Promises Kept," Irving Bernstein views the major 
issue as religion in the 1960 campaign. 
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Committee . . . [who] voted against sending the aid-to-education bill to the floor of the 
House or Senate. "36 Nixon challenged Senator Kennedy's description of the Rules 
Committee vote by noting: 
. . . there are eight Democrats on that committee and four 
Republicans. . . . It is very difficult to blame the four 
Republicans for the eight Democrats not getting something 
through that particular committee. 37 
In the second debate, Kennedy promised "moral leadership" in the struggle for 
"equality of education in all sections of the United States. "38 Nixon appearing more 
aggressive than in the first debate, criticized Kennedy's call "for high hopes" rather than 
"executive leadership .... I believe it's essential that the President ... not only set the 
tone, but he also must lead. "39 This was in contrast to what he characterized as 
Eisenhower's silence on the Brown v. Board of Education verdict. Whereas the first two 
debates addressed education, the third mentioned it only in passing, while the fourth was 
devoted entirely to foreign policy. Overall, domestic issues centered on the performance 
of the economy and to a lesser degree on civil rights, on which both candidates rather 
carefully hedged. 
The debates unquestionably stimulated campaign interest but the role of 
education played a very small part. Most of the debates featured both candidates 
confronting each other over international issues. Much of the time, the candidates were, 
~he Joint Appearances of Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. 
Nixon, Presidential Campaign, Senate Report, 994, pt. Ill, December 11, 1961, p. 86. 
37lbid, p. 87. 
38lbid, p. 151. 
39lbid, p. 152. 
34 
in the words of Samuel Johnson, "arguing for victory." They sought to score points rather 
than clarify them. As one analyst of the debates has noted: 
The reporters were a problem as they hopped from subject 
to subject, forcing the candidates into positions where they 
were not so much debating with one another as competing 
with one another to give effective answers to the 
questions. 40 
It also gave to reporters the power, by the questions asked, to shape in some measure 
the crucial election issues. 
In his account of the 1960 campaign, Theodore White blamed television's 
tendency to demand constant action for the disappointing treatment of issues during the 
debates. 
All TV and radio discussion programs are compelled to 
snap question and answer back and forth as if the 
contestants were adversaries in an intellectual tennis 
match. . . . The most thoughtful and responsive answers 
to any difficult question came after a long pause, and that 
the longer the pause the more illuminating the thought that 
follows it, nonetheless the electronic media cannot bear to 
suffer a pause of more than five seconds; a pause of thirty 
seconds of dead time on the air seems interminable. Thus, 
snapping their two-and-a-half-minute answers back and 
forth, both candidates could only react for the cameras.41 
In the debates as well as the campaign, it would be the religious issue which 
would be most powerful in getting out the vote. Though many issues were raised by 
both candidates, none proved strong enough to break through the wall of religious 
feeling. This was, as one observer noted, "the fate of the televised debates."42 They did 
40Bernard Rubin, Political Television (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1967) I p, 52. 
41White, p. 331. 
42Samuel Lubell, "Personalities vs. Issues," in Sidney Kraus (ed.), The Great Debates 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 161. 
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result in a sharp increase in popularity for Kennedy, but any advantage was muted by 
anti-Catholic opposition. 
Senator Kennedy had declared himself an ardent supporter of federal aid to public 
education and placed it high on his list of domestic priorities. Vice-President Nixon had 
introduced a bold education plan of his own during the campaign. But the issue of 
federal aid to public education was overshadowed by the religious issue and the 
discussion of foreign affairs. In the most recent appraisal of the Kennedy presidency, 
Irving Bernstein suggests, "in 1960, excepting party loyalty, religion was the most 
important issue to voters. •43 
NEA leaders had been concerned whether the Catholic senator, if elected, would 
resist the pressure of the Church hierarchy when faced with a decision on federal school 
legislation. In private and public statements, he assured NEA leaders that he considered 
federal school support an education question. He said that if elected, he would not only 
support such legislation, but would give leadership to the effort. As Frank Munger and 
Richard Fenno have emphasized in their 1962 study of the federal aid fight, the NEA did 
not express "an open endorsement of either candidate." However, NEA literature 
"circulated during the fall of 1960 made it clear that the Democratic presidential 
candidates stand on federal aid was in agreement with NEA policy while the Republican 
candidate's was not."44 Even so, the NEA's de facto endorsement of Kennedy was not 
strong enough to increase his narrow margin of victory. 
43lrving Bernstein, Promises Kept: JFK's New Frontier (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p. 37. 
44Munger and Fenno, p. 183. The NEA avoided formal presidential endorsements 
until its 1976 endorsement of Jimmy Carter. 
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Toward the campaign's close, on November 2, 1960, Kennedy pledged in a 
speech in Los Angeles that, "in 1961 , a Democratic Congress--under the leadership of 
a Democratic President--will enact a bill to raise teachers' salaries as well as fund school 
construction. "45 With his winning plurality of only 112,803 popular votes out of 
68,329,895 votes cast, the responsibility of translating promises into programs might 
prove difficult to "move America forward.• 
45"The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy," Senate Report 994, pt. I, December 
11, 1961 ' p. 1235. 
CHAPTER Ill 
LAUNCHING THE NEW FRONTIER 
Early in 1960, in a speech at the National Press Club, John Kennedy put forward 
his conception of the Presidency. Kennedy asserted that a President "must be above all 
a Chief Executive in every sense of the word ... , a Chief Executive who is the vital center 
of the action in our whole scheme of government. "1 He was determined to be a strong 
president. Action would represent the early days of the Kennedy Administration. 
Following what he considered the status quo approach of the Eisenhower Administration, 
Kennedy prescribed a greater role for his office, the Federal government, and the 
American people. 
Kennedy's Presidential model was in many ways the product of Columbia 
University professor Richard Neustadt. In his influential Presidential Power (1960), he 
argued that the officeholder is potentially bigger than the office. A President's ability to 
reach this potential depends upon the manner in which he exploits what Neustadt called 
his "effective influence." These three sources of influence are: (a) "the bargaining 
advantages ... with which he persuades other men that what he wants of them is what 
their own responsibilities require them to do"; (b} "the expectations of those other men 
regarding his ability and will to use the advantages they think he has"; and (c) "those 
men's estimates of how his public views him and how their public may view them if they 
1Lewis J. Paper, The Promise and the Performance: The Leadership of JFK (New York, 
Crown, Inc., 1976), p. 67. 
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do what he wants. "2 Kennedy adopted both the philosophy and philosopher as Neustadt 
became a Special Assistant to the President. 
In the area of federal aid to education, Kennedy could choose from three 
presidential approaches. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had dedicated himself to a 
policy of experimentation as governor of New York, but realized the states were not 
equipped to adequately address the economic emergency of the depression. With his 
election, the federal government assumed a greater role in education under the New Deal 
of the 1930s. 
The Public Works Administration, created in 1933, issued loans and grants for 
school and college construction. The Works Projects (later "Progress") Administration, 
launched in 1935, supported various educational programs. Between July 1935 and 
March 1938, approximately $93 million poured into WPA projects. During this same 
period, an average of forty-three thousand teachers worked under the program, with 
maximum employment reaching sixty thousand in March 1936. 3 
The Civilian Conservation Corps (1933) and the National Youth Association (1935) 
offered vocational training as well as employment for people of high school and college 
age. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration, as of February 1934, was disbursing 
$48 million to employ unemployed teachers and $75 million to pay overdue salaries of 
teachers. The Social Security Act of 1939 earmarked federal funds for vocational 
education for physically disabled children. 
2Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Policy of Leadership, (New York: Wiley, 
1968), p. 179. 
3Muncie, p. 27. 
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The position of President Roosevelt on the issue of Federal aid to education was 
extremely important. In a letter written in 1935 to Mr. S. L. Smith of the Julius Rosenwald 
Fund, Roosevelt set forth his opinion concerning the possibility of direct federal aid.4 Mr. 
Smith had written to the President concerning the poor financial conditions existing in 
many school systems in the nation. He suggested setting up a Secretary of Education 
and Relief, and implied federal aid would be helpful. The President replied that the only 
type of "encouragement• the federal government could offer was in the form of loans at 
a low rate of interest. He made no mention of any possibility of direct federal financial 
aid.5 
Later that same year, Roosevelt also made his views known concerning the 
problem of aid to parochial schools. He believed all financial grants to these schools 
were unconstitutional, since "the historic policy of this country which separates church 
and state is felt to be violated whenever such grants are made. "6 
Franklin Roosevelt had taken only one hundred days to revolutionize the federal 
role in social welfare, but it would take him five years to appoint a committee to study 
federal aid to education. By mid-1939, many groups and individuals were pressuring the 
President for direct financial aid. Taking the lead was the National Education Association. 
Amy H. Hinricks, President of the NEA, presented its position in a letter to Roosevelt. 
She said the NEA was "keenly disappointed" by the failure of the federal government to 
enact a program of "general education," and asked for a "message of reassurance" to the 
supporters of education. Roosevelt yielded somewhat to this pressure. In a press 
4Muncie, p. 29. 
5 lbid, p. 29. 
6 lbid, p. 30. 
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conference on December 22, 1939, he indicated he was in favor of federal aid for states 
such as Georgia and Mississippi because "they were unable to bear the burden alone. "7 
But as Gilbert E. Smith suggests, "Roosevelt's efforts to hold together a weakened 
coalition made it virtually impossible for him to support legislation that included such 
divisive issues as race, religion, and federal control."8 
Programs initiated by the New Deal do furnish proof of successful aid to 
education. The federal government provided the aid, while the states retained control of 
their systems. Non-public schools participated in the program, indicating that problem 
might also be resolved. However, as John Muncie points out, "Congress passed this 
legislation during a time of grave national emergency," and federal aid to education was 
"merely an incidental portion of the entire plan of recovery."9 
Harry Truman established himself as the strongest ally of federal aid to education 
yet to inhabit the White House. In his budget message to Congress January 3, 1947, 
Truman proclaimed: 
I have long been on record for basic legislation under 
which the Federal Government will supplement the 
resources of the States to assist them to equalize 
educational opportunities and achieve satisfactory 
educational standards. 10 
A torrent of no less than twenty education bills followed the President's message. 
7lbid, p. 32. 
8Smith, p. 117. 
9Muncie, p. 28. 
10Harry S. Truman, "Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1948," 
January 10, 1947, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Vol. 1947 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 76. 
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As one historian of the struggle over the federal government and education, 
Robert Bendiner, has suggested, two critical developments tempered the optimism of 
Truman's statement. The first was the enactment of the LaFollette-Monroney Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946, designed to streamline a growing congressional committee 
system, which consolidated the House Labor and Education Committees into a single 
entity. The result, Bendiner notes, was that labor legislation assumed primacy over 
federal aid within the new group.11 The second was the Republican victory in the 1946 
Congressional elections. The Republican repudiation of Truman at the polls greatly 
enhanced the chances that Congress would again fail to enact federal aid. 12 
With the reelection of the Democratic President and the return of a Democratic 
Congress after a two year period, federal aid supporters resumed their fight. On March 
18, 1949, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare unanimously reported what 
Bendiner labels 
a skillful compromise, . . . providing some grants, 
authorizing expenditures for teachers' salaries and current 
operative costs, but not for construction; and allowing 
states that already permitted public money to be spent on 
nonpublic schools for transportation and textbooks to use 
their Federal grants for the same purpose.13 
The bill passed the Senate 58-15. 
In the House, Education Subcommittee Chairman Graham Barden of North 
Carolina revised the bill to exclude aid to nonpublic schools and preclude federal control 
by eliminating periodic state reports to the federal government. Education and Labor 
11 Bendiner, p. 82. 
12lbid, p. 83. 
13lbid, p. 90. 
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Committee Chairman John Lesinski of Michigan restored the provisions of the Senate 
measure, but the damage inflicted by Barden remained. A 13-12 Committee vote 
"doused the federal aid flame yet again."14 
Harry Truman, the first president under whom Kennedy served in the Congress, 
fought for a New Deal in education. Congress was generally more interested in fighting 
yesterday's battles over existing New Deal legislation. After a Republican majority 
attempted to undo the New Deal, a Democratic majority tried to restore it. The fury 
unleashed within the House Education and Labor Committee during the Truman years 
left Congress gun-shy toward federal aid to education. In a political climate dominated 
by charges of corruption, the communist threat at home, and the outbreak of the Korean 
War, the House of Representatives hid behind the religious issue, and Truman and the 
Senate lost their enthusiasm for federal aid. 
President Eisenhower indicated quite early in his administration that he recognized 
the need for aid, but he would not act until the problem and possible solutions were 
completely analyzed. He believed the situation called for "study and action."15 In. 
January of 1954, Eisenhower gave form to the course of action his administration would 
pursue. His Second Annual message cited public education as a state and local 
responsibility. 16 However, the federal government would stand ready to assist states 
which could not provide sufficient school buildings. 
14Citron, p. 104. 
15Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," 
February 2, 1953, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, vol. 1953 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 32. 
16Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," 
January 7, 1954, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, vol. 1954, p. 21. 
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Eisenhower often declared his support for federal aid for school construction, but 
never actively participated in the struggle. This was a new approach, since previous 
attempts to aid the schools did not limit the use of funds to construction, but instead 
covered a broad area of educational costs, including teachers' salaries. 
In February of 1955, Eisenhower proposed a three-year, $73 million school 
construction program to be financed by local school bonds, federal backing for state 
school construction bonds, and federal matching grants. 17 Democratic Senators H. 
Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Lister Hill of Alabama, and Representative Augustine 
Kelley of Pennsylvania produced a similar bill for $600 million a year for six years. 18 For 
the first time since World War II, the House debated a school aid proposal, the so-called 
"Kelley bill.• During the course of the lively debate, Representative Adam Clayton Powell 
of New York introduced an anti-segregation amendment. It was approved, stricken, and 
then accepted again. But while the amendment won, the bill lost. 
' The struggle for federal aid to elementary and secondary education reached its 
peak in 1957 after a $325 million, four-year school construction proposal very similar to 
the 1955 Eisenhower plan met with the approval of the House Democratic and 
Republican leadership. 19 Although burdened by neither great expense nor an anti-
segregation amendment, the bill died before it came to a vote. Eisenhower, criticized by 
many for failing to intercede in the battle to ensure the bill's passage, replied that "he was 
fed up with compromising on education bills and that only his 1955 proposal had his 
17Citron, p. 118. 
18lbid, p. 120. 
19lbid, p. 146. 
44 
"thorough" approval.20 He explained his low profile on the education debate, stating, 
"You don't influence Congress ... by threats, by anything except ... the soundness and 
logic of your views. "21 His evasion on federal aid can be in part attributed to his 
increasing apprehension over the country's economy. This came at a time when the cost 
of living had risen four percent within the previous year and Secretary of the Treasury 
George Humphry was forecasting a depression.22 
Kennedy had chosen the Truman approach with his fiercely partisan treatment of 
federal aid in the campaign. This had included his inaccurate depiction of Richard Nixon 
as an enemy of a federal role in education. 
Shortly after his nomination, candidate Kennedy had appointed with "appropriate 
publicity a series of advisory committees whose reports were to be delivered during the 
transition period. "23 On November 8, president-elect Kennedy appointed Theodore 
Sorensen special counsel to the president and charged him to recruit "a series of 
unannounced task forces from the ranks of the professions, foundations, and university 
faculties. "24 The number of those participating "was close to one hundred men, who 
received neither compensation nor expense money . . . although public release of the 
reports ... brought considerable public attention to at least the task force chairman. "25 
20Price, p. 12. 
21 Munger and Fenno, p. 91. 
22william A. McCormack, "The Struggle to Secure Federal Aid for Education, 1959-
1960" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1961 }, p. 117. 
23Sorensen, p. 265. 
24lbid, p. 267. 
25Graham, p. 10. 
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The task force operation also proved to be an excellent recruiting device. Kennedy saw 
the various task forces as a way to promote new projects. He viewed them as "part of 
the theater of government. "26 The task forces "carried a sense of the importance of 
getting things done"27 unlike committees which connoted bureaucratic inertia. 
THE HOVDE TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION 
Kennedy named Frederick Hovde, president of Purdue University, to chair the six 
man task force to study education. The other members were Alvin Eurich, a vice 
president of the Ford Foundation; Francis Keppel, dean of the Harvard School of 
Education; John Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation; Russell Thackery, 
executive secretary of the American Land Grant Colleges Association; and Benjamin 
Willis, superintendent of public schools in Chicago, president-elect of the American 
Association of School Administrators, and chairman of the Educational Policies 
Commission of the Nation Education Association. It was a "distinguished body,• 
dominated by representatives of higher education. The interests of elementary and 
secondary education were represented only by Willis, but it was also one that contained 
"no representatives of the conservative, Southern, Democratic, Catholic church, or NAACP 
positions" on the volatile question of federal aid to schools.28 
26Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg, The Presidential Advisory System 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. XVI. 
27Louis Koenig, "Administrative Chief," in Aida DiPace Donald (ed.), John F. Kennedy 
and the New Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p. 26. 
28Hugh Douglas Price, "Race, Religion, and the Rules Committee," in Alan Westin 
(ed.), The Uses of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1962), p. 21. 
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Within weeks of receiving its orders, the task force had identified "legislative and 
administrative proposals of the highest priority," after sifting through "more than sixty 
legislative proposals put forward" in the past several years.29 
This group of scholars reported their findings to the President in early January, 
1961. They indicated that the nation's schools were in dire need of financial assistance 
if they were to perform their necessary functions in a democratic society. The task force 
recommended: 
1. The transfer of thirty dollars per annum per pupil based on average daily 
attendance in public schools, from the federal government to the states, for construction, 
teachers's salaries, or "other purposes related to the improvement of education"--the 
annual cost would be $1 .2 billion. 
2. The assignment of twenty federal dollars per student in average daily 
attendance in public schools with "provision to assure maintenance of state and local 
effort and funds should be [made] available for construction, salaries, or other purposes 
related to the improvement of education in the public schools as the states may 
determine." About seven million children from one-fourth of the states would benefit from 
this plan. The annual costs would be $140 million. 
3. The expenditure of twenty dollars per child in average daily attendance in 
the public schools of cities of over 300,000 population, which "are facing unique and 
grave educational problems." A formula based on population density, nature of housing, 
and percentage of high school graduates would determine the eligibility for such 
29Letter, Frederick Hovde to Sorensen, January 2, 1961, Pre-Presidential Papers, Box 
1071, Transition Files, Education Task Force Report, JFKL. 
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assistance. It was estimated that the education of six million children could be improved 
at a cost of $120 million. 
4. The establishment of a President's Advisory Commission on Education.30 
The most startling aspect of the Hovde recommendations was the price tag. It 
totalled more than $9,390,000,000 in grants and loans over the next four-and-one-half 
years. Out of this, $5,840,000,000 would go to public schools in the form of grants to the 
states (for construction, salaries, or other appropriate educational expenditures).31 This 
amounted to an annual total of $2,310,000,000, which far exceeded the most generous 
Senate bill that had failed the previous year. In that Senate bill of 1960, the Democrats 
had enjoyed an even larger majority in Congress. Clearly, the Hovde report called for a 
massive and permanent federal role in education, with elementary and secondary aid 
reserved for the public schools only. 
Kennedy's private judgment of the task reports ranged from "helpful" to "terrific."32 
The President's reaction to the Hovde report was mixed. Hovde told the press that 
"anything less ... would not be significant for a program of uplifting education," while 
Kennedy cautiously said there was "great value" in the report. He added, "I don't know 
whether we have the resources immediately to take on the whole program."33 Privately, 
according to Sorensen, Kennedy was "quite annoyed, quite upset'' because he thought 
it was a "very unrealistic program." He also "correctly felt the press would feel that this 
30Sidney Tiedt, The Role of the Federal Government in Education (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), pp. 166-68, and Report of the Task Force Committee on 
Education, undated, Pre-Presidential Papers, Box 1071, Transition Files, Education, JFKL. 
31 Graham, p. 12. 
32Sorensen, p. 237. 
33New York Times, January 7, 1961. 
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was the program he was going to put into effect."34 The conservative press attacked 
the recommendations, playing up "the enormous billion dollar cost" of the plan. 
Conservative critics quickly noted that many educators were increasingly inclined to 
equate quality with the amount of dollars spent. The President, as Assistant Secretary 
of HEW, Wilbur Cohen, remembered, "didn't like these big figures. He didn't want the 
idea getting over that he was a man who was just interested in spending a lot of 
money!35 The "undue• emphasis given to the program's price tag "frustrated the 
President, who felt attention should properly have been focused on the merits of the 
Hovde proposals. "36 
The most damaging reaction came three days before the inauguration when 
Cardinal Spellman criticized the Hovde task force recommendations at a major address 
in the Bronx. He demanded that some of the money go to the 11 percent of the nation's 
school children who attended parochial schools. The Cardinal believed the President's 
plan meant that Roman Catholics would be "taxed more than ever before for the 
education of their children,• but they could not expect any return from their taxes. The 
Cardinal repeatedly announced his disbelief that Congress would accept the task force 
proposals, which would be depriving parochial school children of "freedom of mind and 
freedom of religion."37 Whether the task force had been designed as a trial balloon or 
not, it indicated an ominous future for the President's aid-to-education legislation. 
34Graham, p. 13. 
35Transcript, "Wilbur Cohen Oral History Interview," November 11, 1964, JFKL, p. 27. 
36 Janet C. Kerr, "From Truman to Johnson: Ad Hoc Policy Formulation in Higher 
Education," Review of Higher Education 8.1 (Fall 1984), p. 33. 
37"The Cardinal's Claim," Time LXXVll (January 27, 1961), p. 62. 
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THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS: 
EXPANDING THE HOUSE RULES COMMITTEE 
From its beginnings, the Kennedy Administration had pledged to "get the country 
moving again." In a mid-December 1960 meeting with Vice President Lyndon Johnson, 
the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn of Texas, and the Senate Majority Leader, Mike 
Mansfield of Montana, Kennedy reached three important decisions regarding education. 
First, his federal aid to education program would be among five domestic issues 
receiving highest priority during the opening session of the 87th Congress. Second, he 
decided that any federal aid bill which he proposed would involve aid to impacted areas. 
Third, he approved Rayburn's intention to reform the House Rules Committee.38 Most 
of his program would not even come to a vote until he had challenged and defeated the 
coalition that "ruled the House and frustrated the more liberal Senate through its control 
of the House Rules Committee. "39 
The decision to include aid to impacted areas demonstrated the popularity of such 
assistance, even among opponents of federal aid legislation. Public Laws 815 and 874 
authorized federal assistance in areas impacted by the installation of a naval or military 
base. Kennedy hoped to eventually phase out what he considered an antiquated 
program. However, he accepted the extension of the program as an enticement for 
Congressmen wavering on federal support. 
The expansion of the conservative-dominated House Rules Committee became 
Kennedy's first major crisis and provided the first great legislative drama of his 
38Parmet, pp. 75-76. 
39Helen Fuller, Year of Trial: Kennedy's Crucial Decisions (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, 1962), p. 80. 
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presidency. It "threatened to cripple the new administration before it could really get 
under way."40 A loss on such a key issue threatened the power and prestige of the new 
president, including his relations with Congress. The outcome also had important 
implications for the way in which the House would conduct its business during the 87th 
Congress. Kennedy realized this battle could not be postponed as it could in the Senate. 
On March 19, 1910, the House of Representatives adopted an amendment to the 
House rules offered by Nebraska Representative George Norris. With this action, the 
House stripped Speaker Joseph Cannon of his authority to appoint the Committee on 
Rules. It also made the Committee an elective body on which the Speaker could not 
serve. 
A conservative coalition began to operate in Congress during Franklin Roosevelt's 
second term. Southern Democrats became upset at the repeal of the two-thirds 
nominating rule which Roosevelt had pushed through the 1936 Democratic Convention. 
This had deprived them of veto power over Presidential candidates. Conservative 
Republicans in Congress expressed shock at Roosevelt's court packing proposal and the 
sit-down strikes of 1937. 
In a combined effort to stop New Deal legislation, this conservative coalition took 
control of the House Rules Committee. They promptly changed it "from traffic cop to 
policy maker."41 Following the rule of "Boss Cannon," the Rules Committee simply 
directed the flow of bills from the committee to the floor. Under the coalition, the 
Committee held the immense power of deciding the merits of the thousands of bills 
40 Jim F. Health, Decade of Disillusionment: The Kennedy-Johnson Years (Bloomington, 
ID: University Press, 1975), p. 63. 
41 Ibid, p. 80. 
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introduced in each session. No legislation could reach the floor without a rule and the 
Rules Committee granted few rules. Even when both the Senate and the House had 
passed a measure, the Committee still had the final word. Unless the two bodies had 
enacted identical bills, "it could prevent the House from entering a conference with the 
Senate to iron out the differences in the two versions. "42 This unofficial "third house" had 
the power to veto a measure desired by the President and passed by the two 
Constitutional houses. Clearly, the House Rules Committee became a formidable 
obstacle to progressive legislation. (The Rules Committee was so powerful, Alaska and 
Hawaii had to wait five years before the Committee addressed their admission to the 
Union.)43 
The chairman of the House Rules Committee was Howard W. Smith, a Democrat 
from Virginia. He was one of the five anti-New Deal Democrats who formed the original 
coalition with Republican colleagues on the committee in 1937. A states rights advocate 
and fiscal conservative, Smith ardently opposed extension of the federal role in American 
life. 
The question of what to do about the Rules Committee was largely up to Speaker 
Sam Rayburn. He had been elected to the House in 1912. For several years, liberal 
Democrats had urged him to do something about the situation. A respected veteran of 
almost half a century, "Mr. Sam" had come to value compromise highly, but Rayburn was 
also a Democrat, "with a deep sense of responsibility to cooperate with the President. "44 
42Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1968), p. 36. 
43Robert Bendiner, Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 
p. 152-53. 
44Price, p. 14. 
52 
After the December meeting with the President, Rayburn assured him that he would win 
control of the Committee. Rayburn did not say "how this was to be done and Kennedy 
did not ask. "45 
Shortly before the opening of the new Congress, Rayburn met with six Democratic 
Congressmen, including House Majority Leader John McCormack and Democratic Whip 
Carl Albert. They unanimously urged Rayburn to purge conservative Representative 
William Colmer of Mississippi, who had refused to support the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. 
Having received this unanimous opinion, Rayburn overrode it. He would add three new 
members to the Committee instead of removing one. Rayburn always thought it "better 
politics to give than to take away"46 He was afraid of upsetting the seniority system as 
well. The Speaker was also conscious of Southern sensibilities, with many members 
loyal to the party, but terrified by the idea of a purge. In addition, it would be difficult to 
explain a vote to purge a white Southerner when they had not voted to purge the black 
Democratic Education and Labor Committee Chairman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. for his 
endorsement of Eisenhower in the 1956 election. 
Rayburn began the new year by approaching "Judge• Smith with his plan--and his 
threat. Smith refused any compromise, leaving no doubt a peaceful solution was out of 
the question. The following week, Smith offered Rayburn a compromise: he would 
guarantee that Kennedy's five priority domestic items (including education) would survive 
the Rules Committee if the Speaker would abandon his plan. This was not good enough. 
Rayburn rejected it with some anger, saying, "The President may want forty bills. "47 
45wicker, p. 61 . 
46Fuller, p. 83. 
47Wicker, p. 64. 
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Clearly, Sam Rayburn and Howard Smith were the protagonists. They knew that "he who 
controls procedure often controls substance," and that was the nature of the fight. 48 But 
the meeting gave Rayburn an opportunity to pursue his strategy. He again offered the 
expansion of the Committee as an alternative to the purge. 
On January 10th, Carl Vinson of Alabama, second in seniority in the House, held 
a caucus of Southern House Democrats. They discussed the alternatives offered by the 
Speaker. With •Judge" Smith among the dissenters, the majority voted to enlarge the 
Committee rather than risk a Colmer purge. 
Rayburn hoped to convene the first binding caucus since 1949. This would have 
forced all Democrats to vote on the floor as two-thirds did in the caucus, but to obtain 
a promise from Smith to consider the Rules Committee expansion bill for an early vote, 
Rayburn agreed not to call a binding caucus or contest Colmer's reappointment to the 
Rules Committee. 
On January 18th, the non-binding Democratic House Caucus approved the 
Rayburn resolution to expand the Rules Committee from twelve members (eight 
Democrats, four Republicans) to fifteen members (ten Democrats, five Republicans). 
Shortly after, the Republican House Conference denounced it. Rayburn's intention to 
press for the expansion of the Rules Committee would require not just a majority of the 
Democratic caucus, but a majority of the entire House membership, including 
Republicans. The key to victory or defeat would not come from the partisans on both 
sides of the aisle. Instead, the crucial votes would come from the center of conservative-
to-moderate Democrats and moderate-to-liberal Republicans. 
481bid, p. 35. 
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On January 24th, the Rules Committee reported out the Rayburn bill 6-2, with only 
the Democratic members present and voting. On January 25th, the day before the 
scheduled vote, Rayburn's informal survey revealed too few votes for his plan. He 
postponed the vote until January 31st, the day after the President's first State of the 
Union Message. It was hoped that Kennedy's eloquence and restraint would convince 
those who were undecided. The postponement was seen in the House as a sign of 
weakness on the part of the Kennedy administration. House Minority Leader Charles 
Halleck of Indiana replied that: 
The majority leader has given us the reason for the 
postponement and I am not going to argue with that. . . . 
But I think .it should be fairly well understood that there 
have been efforts at the Cabinet level to call members on 
our side in the last few hours. Perhaps other moves may 
be in contemplation--1 do not know."49 
He also wryly added, "The New Frontier is having trouble with its first roundup. "50 That 
same evening, at his first press conference, President Kennedy announced his position 
on nationwide television. He declared that any rule changes in the House were an 
internal matter entirely under the control of the House members. He added that while he 
gave his news "as an interested citizen ... the House should have an opportunity to vote 
themselves on the program which we will present. "51 Congressional response was swift. 
Republican Representative Frank T. Bow of Ohio stated: 
It is regrettable that Mr. Kennedy has added to the 
confusion, although he said he was speaking as a private 
citizen. . . . The President has injected himself into this 
controversy. . . . The responsibility as to what legislation 
49Congressional Record, January 25, 1961, p. 1224. 
50New York Times, January 26, 1961. 
51New York Times, January 26, 1961. 
will eventually be voted upon by the membership of the 
House of Representatives lies with the Democratic 
leadership--not with the Rules Committee. 52 
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A week of intense lobbying led by Congressional liaison Lawrence O'Brien 
followed the vote on the committee expansion resolution. O'Brien enlisted Andrew 
Biemiller, chief lobbyist of the AFL-CIO, and Rayburn employed Congressman Richard 
Bolling of Missouri. Their strategy was to hold "Southern defections to less than 60" and 
have "at least 16 Republican conversions."53 Vice President Johnson, from Texas, and 
Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges, a North Carolinian, targeted Southern 
Congressmen. Interior Secretary Stewart Udall, from Arizona, pressured Western 
Republicans. On the morning before the vote, Kennedy telephoned three important 
House members. 54 
The vote came on January 31st. The importance of this vote revealed itself when 
Speaker Rayburn made a rare address to his colleagues. He contended that Kennedy's 
"New Frontier'' would not receive the trial it deserved without reform of the Rules 
Committee. The Speaker forcefully concluded, "I think the House should be allowed on 
great measures to work its will, and it cannot work its will if the Committee on Rules is 
so constituted as not to allow the House to pass on those things. "55 Next came Judge 
Smith's turn. In a "quiet, almost disinterested voice" he gave his personal assurance that 
the Kennedy program would be released. He described his reasons for opposing 
Rayburn's plan to pack the Committee on Rules and then proudly declared, "Nobody can 
52Congressional Record, January 26, 1961, p. 1345. 
53Fuller, p. 86. 
54Price, p. 17. 
55Congressional Record, January 31, 1961, p. 1508. 
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humiliate me except the people who have elected me to Congress sixteen consecutive 
times. "56 Then the long roll call began. The final vote was a narrow 217 to 212 vote, 
increasing the size of the Committee on Rules. Among the absentees was Republican 
ex-Speaker Joe Martin, who had been out of the country. Rayburn sorely needed 
Republican votes and could have used Martin's support, which he had been promised. 
Rayburn left the Chambers smiling, brushing past members and reporters who trailed 
behind offering congratulations. Asked how he felt, "Rayburn's eyes twinkled. I feel all 
right. That's as good as a man can feel. I always feel good when I win."57 
The Kennedy Administration had won its first skirmish in Congress, despite sixty-
four Southern and border state Democrats voting against the resolution. But the 
administration had the solid support of Northern and Western Democrats, plus the crucial 
supporting votes of 22 Republicans. 58 The Kennedy victory had been costly, however. 
"With all of that going for us," the President observed, "with Rayburn's own reputation at 
stake, with all of the pressures and appeals a new President could make, we won by five 
votes. "59 The embittered atmosphere following the Rayburn-Smith exchange remained 
in the House chamber. Many House Democrats felt they had been under interrogation, 
making the issue virtually one of personal loyalty. 
The day after the vote, Republican John J. Flynt of Georgia charged Rayburn with 
attempting to buy his support by promising Flynt a seat on the coveted Appropriations 
SSWicker, p. 59. 
57D. B. Hardeman and Donald C. Bacon, Rayburn: A Biography (Austin, TX: Texas 
Monthly Press, 1987), p. 465. 
58Congressional Record, January 31, 1961, pp. 1958-1590 .. 
59Sorensen, p. 382. 
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Committee if he voted correctly. 60 The widespread accusations of pressures and 
reprisals demonstrated the ferocity over the House Rules Committee vote. But Rayburn 
had, as Robert Caro describes, "an indefinable knack for sensing the mood of the House; 
he seemed to know, by some intuitive instinct for the legislative process, just how far it 
could be pushed. "61 
Caro describes how "few people, if they depended on the public prints for their 
information, knew much about him. "62 Rayburn received little credit for his role in the 
passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Stock Exchange Act of 1934, and the Holding 
Company during the early New Deal period. He has received little credit from history, "in 
part because he left almost no record of his deeds in writing." In fact, it is possible to 
read histories of the New Deal and "find hardly a reference to Sam Rayburn."63 He was 
inconspicuous outside of the halls of power, and in part because he was shy, he avoided 
publicity. "Let the other fellow get the headlines," he said, "I'll take the laws."64 
Judge Smith, who had called the final vote "all baloney,• took his defeat hard. He 
indicated that having received "a mandate to call up legislation, he would do so-with a 
vengeance."65 Within three weeks of the vote to enlarge his committee, Smith flooded 
60"lt is Still the House that Mr. Sam the Speaker Runs," Newsweek 57 (February 13, 
1961) I pp, 26-28. 
61 Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1982), p. 319. 
62lbid, p. 327. 
63lbid, p. 327. 
64lbid, p. 328. 
65Price, p. 20. 
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the House with hearings on bills that were either embarrassing to the administration or 
vigorously opposed by the Speaker. 
More threatening to the Kennedy legislation campaign was the effect of the Rules 
fight on Republicans. Under the able leadership of Minority Leader Charles Halleck, the 
Republicans amassed a substantial vote against the Rayburn effort. His defense of the 
former Rules Committee surprised both the members of the House and Speaker Rayburn. 
The Kennedy forces sought to divide the conservative Democratic-Republican alliance. 
By doing so they could enact the Kennedy Domestic program, but the Rules Committee 
battle had aggravated a partisan environment "already poisoned by the narrowness of 
Kennedy's election and the conviction" that many Republicans felt "Kennedy had stolen 
the White House. "66 
The Kennedy Administration had its victory, but coming only eleven days after 
Kennedy's moving inaugural address, it deprived the new President of the traditional 
honeymoon with the legislature. The administration had also held nothing in reserve and 
could not bring the same pressure to bear for every item on the President's list. Clearly, 
the White House had cause for concern about the future of the Kennedy legislative 
program. In an interview some time after the House Rules victory, Lawrence O'Brien 
ironically remarked, "I often wonder what would have happened if we had lost by one 
vote."67 
66McAndrews, p. 151. 
67Fuller, p. 88. 
CHAPTER IV 
A NATION AT RISK: 
PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THE EDUCATION BILL OF 1961 
The 1960 election was one of the closest in American history. Kennedy ran 
behind many of the Democrats elected to the House and Senate. But the real test, "he 
remarked soon after his victory, was not his election but his administration. "1 Kennedy 
was aware of the difficulties facing his domestic program, but as in his campaign, he did 
not hesitate to promote his education proposal. 
One historian of American education, Chester Finn, has suggested that 
"Presidents seldom think about education. . . . As seen from the White House, education 
is a low-level issue that commands no precedence on the ever-lengthening list of 
presidential concerns. "2 But Kennedy considered enactment of an education bill as the 
most important social welfare goal for 1961. According to his assistant and biographer, 
Theodore Sorensen, education was "the one domestic subject that mattered most to John 
Kennedy."3 
Kennedy promised during the 1960 campaign that great deeds would follow. 
Shortly after the election, Kennedy began to work on his first educational message. His 
remarks would not only unveil his education program, but serve as one of his first 
1Sorensen, p. 400. 
2Chester Finn, Education and the Presidency (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and 
Company, 1977), p.103. 
3Sorensen, p. 401. 
60 
domestic policy statements of the new administration. There were two domestic "special 
messages" to Congress which preceded his education message. The first was on 
economic recovery and the second covered health and hospital care. These "special 
messages• were not addresses delivered by Kennedy, but one in which clerks read his 
remarks to Congress. 
Kennedy's address would come at a time when self-proclaimed liberals were 
skeptical of his attraction to the ideas of political scientist Richard Neustadt and other 
intellectuals. They were also concerned about his past alliances with McCarthyites and 
budget balancing. During the 1960 Democratic convention, a member of Americans for 
Democratic Action remarked, "It isn't what Kennedy believes that worries me. It's whether 
he believes anything. "4 But Kennedy had always resisted the effort to "tag him with an 
ideological label" often saying, "I'm not a liberal at all. ... I'm not comfortable with those 
people. "5 As James MacGregor Burns wrote in a biography of John Kennedy that was 
published just before the 1960 campaign, Kennedy's liberalism was shaped in "fits and 
starts ... with concrete problems." He remarked that "while some people have their 
liberalism 'made' ... by their late 20's, ... I didn't. ... It was only later that I got into 
the stream of things. "6 Kennedy's self-confidence "rested more on his estimate of his 
own abilities than on any identification with any philosophy."7 
The question of Kennedy's religion also continued to pose a problem for the 
president, as it had during the campaign. He never believed the 1960 election had 
4Parnet, pp. 36-37. 
5Burns, pp. 134-135. 
6 lbid, p. 155. 
7McAndrews, p. 157. 
-----i 
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removed religion as an issue. Cardinal Spellman's attack on the Hovde Task Force 
recommendations and several journals critical of the administration's approach to 
education confirmed the Presidents view. In America, the national Catholic weekly 
magazine, an editorial argued the "separation of Church and State is meant to preserve 
freedom and justice, not to serve as a pretext for taxing a constitutional right out of 
existence. "6 
Kennedy's education message would also make known his commitment to civil 
rights. His choice of a Southern running mate and his ability to maintain and build upon 
a position of racial toleration, allowed candidate Kennedy to pursue actively what Virginia 
segregationist Harry Byrd called a "both sides against the middle strategy."9 
THE 1961 EDUCATION BILL-PERMANENT SUPPORT 
Kennedy forwarded his first special message on education to Congress on 
February 20, 1961. In it, he made recommendations in each of the three areas covered 
by the Hovde Task Force, plus proposals in vocational education. But congressional 
attention focused on his proposals for aid to elementary and secondary schools. He 
proposed a three-year program of federal support for public school classroom 
construction and teachers' salaries. Based essentially on the bill which passed the 
Senate in 1960 (S.8), although beginning at a lower level, Kennedy's program would 
assure a minimum $15 per annum for every pupil in average daily attendance with the 
6"Freedom to Education," America 54 (January 28, 1961), p. 552. 
9Carl Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977), p. 57. 
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total amount ($666 million the first year, $866 million over three years) 10 distributed 
according to the equalization formula contained in the 1960 Senate bill. This formula 
would give Mississippi, the poorest state, $29.67 per child, and New York and New 
Jersey, two of the wealthiest states, the minimal $15 per child. 11 Kennedy's pledge of 
assistance for teachers' salaries as well as school building construction solidly aligned 
him with the position of the National Education Association and the American Federation 
of Teachers (AFT). The day after the message, an NEA delegation arrived at the White 
House to assure the president of their support. Selma Borchard of the American 
Federation of Teachers called the Kennedy proposal "the most far-seeing program for 
education that has been urged by the White House since the Morrill Act. 12 
His message, which was read by clerks in both houses, also touched on the 
crucial issue of aid to parochial schools: 
In accordance with the clear prohibition of the Constitution, 
no elementary or secondary school funds are allocated for 
constructing church schools or paying church school 
teachers' salaries; and thus nonpublic school children are 
10John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Education," February 20, 
1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Vol. 1961 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 108. 
11Wicker, p. 123. In 1862, Abraham Lincoln signed the Morrill Act providing for grants 
of land to each "loyal" state for the establishment of colleges specializing in agricultural 
and mechanical arts. The Morrill Act was significant not only because of the large 
number of colleges it established, but also because it changed the type of aid previously 
made available to the states. The act marked a transition from general aid to grants in 
aid for specific types of education. This established a trend which continued down to 
1965. 
12Selma Borchard, "The AF of T Aid Program in Washington," American Teacher 45 
(April 1961 ), p. 7. 
rightfully not counted in determining the funds each state 
will receive for its public schools. 13 
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This proclamation was applauded by many Protestants and separationists of all faiths, 
while discouraging those favoring aid to parochial schools. Monsignor William E. 
McManus, superintendent of schools for the Archdiocese of Chicago remarked that aid 
to parochial schools "would not violate the Constitution. It involves a public policy. We're 
asking for a service.• Kennedy's New Frontier •would disregard the needs of 15 percent 
of the nation's school children."14 Still others wrote that Kennedy believed "religious 
faith is a personal affair, that ecclesiastical authorities had no special claim over public 
officials."15Meanwhile, Boston's Roman Catholic diocesan weekly, The Pilot, looked to 
Congress for encouragement: "Plainly we have been working on the edge of this large 
question for many years but we have never probed it. Now is the time for Congress to 
take the initiative and seek a definitive answer."16 
Most of the press attention focused on what Kennedy said about nonpublic 
schools. Equally important to the speech were its liberal tenets and legislative limitations. 
Kennedy's pronouncement of an educational crisis, marked by a lack of classrooms and 
teachers, was a product of the prevalent belief, coming from the successes of Public 
Laws 815 and 874, and the National Defense Act, that the enactment of federal education 
13Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Education," February 20, 1961, p. 
109. 
14"The School Argument--What Leaders Say," U.S. News & World Report 50 (March 
20, 1961 }, p. 79. 
15Lawrence H. Fuchs, John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism (New York: 
Meredith Press, 1967), p. 224. 
16"Battle Over Schools," Time 77 (March 17, 1961), p. 13. 
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legislation comes only amidst a perceived emergency like the Korean war or the Sputnik 
mission. 
The discussion of a national crisis was further by the Bureau of the Budget which 
successfully urged modifications of aspects of the Hovde Task Force Report. The task 
force and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had recommended special 
attention be paid to the nation's large cities. Coincidentally, these regions had assured 
Kennedy's victory. But the Bureau of the Budget argued the "evidence is not clear" that 
the large urban areas "are worse off in terms of local financial resources for education 
than other areas of the nation." They concluded the proposal would be "deferred until 
... more study can be given."17 
Kennedy's decision not to pursue giving special attention to the big cities (except 
for the proposed ten percent of federal funds to be channeled into "depressed areas and 
slum neighborhoods") was politically sound. The extensive demands of the program 
envisioned by the task force would have dangerously reinforced his image among the 
powerful rural and Southern interests in Congress as the guarantor of a Northern urban 
constituency. But Kennedy's failure to either broaden it to encompass rural areas of 
poverty or replace it with another program left Kennedy without any reliable alternative. 
The Bureau of the Budget believed the further the education message strayed 
from S.8 (Senator McNamara's two-year school construction bill which had passed the 
Senate in 1960 by a roll call vote of 51 to 34) the more difficulty it would face. A bill 
similar to S.8 "would probably be reported out of committee in a few days and would be 
passed overwhelmingly without extensive debate ... marking a significant administration 
17McAndrews, p. 163. 
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achievement." As a political matter, "the big city congressmen already favor S.8 ... 
which rural congressmen ... would be repelled by the Hovde formula."18 
While Kennedy's pronouncement of a crisis in education may have won him some 
votes for President, the 1960 election probably weakened the prospects for federal 
assistance. Not only was Kennedy narrowly elected, but for the first time in the twentieth 
century, the party entering the White House failed to increase its numbers in Congress. 
The Democrats lost one Senate and 22 House seats. In the House, "the Republicans lost 
seven incumbents, while displacing 29 Democrats, every one of them a Kennedy 
progressive. "19 Since an education bill had not passed in 1960, it was unlikely that it 
would in 1961. 
Throughout the postwar period, there had been periodic efforts to provide federal 
aid to education. The issues were many: whether federal aid should go to segregated 
schools, to Catholic schools; whether wealthy states should contribute to the poorer 
schools; would the federal government follow its investment in education by attempting 
to seize control of local school systems; did the states have the right to finance and 
administer schools. Each of these factors, some or all in combination, had proved too 
much for any president or congress to overcome in the 15 years preceding John 
Kennedy's election to the White House. It became obvious at the beginning of 1961 that 
all of these factors would enter the education debate. But many felt 1961 would be the 
year in which those forces would be overcome and an education program enacted. It 
would be the year because John Kennedy had repeatedly said so in his vigorous 
18Memorandum of Conversation by Jack Forsythe, Wilbur Cohen, Mike Feldman 
regarding Education Bill, February 13, 1961, Sorensen Papers, JFK Speech Files, 1961-
63, Box 61, JFKL. 
19Sorensen, p. 379. 
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presidential campaign. He strongly believed a Wilsonian Presidential effort could 
accomplish anything. 
Kennedy's support of federal aid to teachers' salaries can be seen as the 
fulfillment of a campaign promise. But with the illusion of a Democratic party majority 
and the emotional intensity of the issue in Congress, his stand was reasonable only as 
a bargaining instrument. The success of Kennedy's proposal would depend on the 
extent to which he would compromise. 
Although designed as a three-year program, Kennedy called his education 
proposal a "limited beginning."2° Kennedy "knew he lacked the votes to put through any 
of the sweeping reforms required to enable a majority to work its will in each house."21 
His overtures to critics of federal control were the inclusion of impacted area aid, choice 
of equalization over flat grants, and reduction of the task force's price tag from thirty to 
fifteen dollars per child22 did little to calm their fears of an intrusive federal education 
bureaucracy. Clearly, Kennedy's education program was bold in that it defied the 
political odds. For a man "who courted danger, the education effort seemed made to 
order."23 
2°Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Education," February 20, 1961, p. 
108. 
21 Sorensen, pp. 386-87. 
22Wicker, pp. 122-23. 
23McAndrews, p. 166. 
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A NEW FRONTIER FOR EDUCATION? 
To the President's surprise, his education program quickly became the object of 
a confrontation which the print and electronic media relished. In a March 1st press 
conference, Kennedy repeated his separationist position. Citing the Everson decision, 
Kennedy involved the child-benefit theory stating, "The Supreme Court made its decision 
... determining that the aid was to the child not to the school. ... There isn't any room 
for debate on that subject." He added "The Constitution clearly prohibits [direct] aid to 
the school, to parochial schools."24 One reporter asked Kennedy to explain why aiding 
parochial elementary and secondary students was unconstitutional when students in 
Roman Catholic institutions of higher learning were receiving financial assistance. 
President Kennedy replied by saying this help was in a different form, since it was "aid 
to the student, not to the school or college, and therefore, not to a particular religious 
group. "25 Kennedy's response had its origins in a February 8, 1961, confidential 
memorandum from General Counsel Alenson W. Willcox to Wilbur Cohen, Assistant 
Secretary to the President for Legislation. In it, Willcox suggested, "it is futile to argue 
whether a grant to a sectarian school is aiding education or aiding religion, because it 
is aiding both.• He stressed, "we can only say that aid to education is so predominantly 
the purpose and effect that any incidental aid to religion is inconsequential."26 Kennedy 
24Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 107-111. 
25lbid, pp. 107-111. 
26Confidential Memorandum from Alenson W. Willcox to Wilbur Cohen, February 8, 
1961, Sorensen Papers, JFK Speech Files, Box 61, JFKL. 
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maintained the interjection of the church-state issue would mean certain defeat for the 
bill. 
The same day as President Kennedy's news conference, Archbishop Karl Alter of 
the National Catholic Welfare Conference Education Department called a press 
conference to announce a four-point summary of the bishop's meeting. Alter reluctantly 
called the press conference to preempt any negative publicity which the NCWC did not 
want. The meeting of the NCWC board consisted of five Cardinals of the American 
Catholic Church plus the ten archbishops and bishops who headed departments. The 
four points were: 
1 . The question of whether or not there ought 
to be federal aid is a judgment to be based on objective 
facts connected with the schools of the country and 
consequently Catholics are free to take a position in 
accordance with the facts. 
2. In the event there is federal aid to education, 
we are deeply convinced that in justice Catholic school 
children should be given the right to participate. 
3. Respecting the form of participation, we hold 
it to be strictly within the framework of the Constitution that 
long-term, low interest loans to private institutions could be 
part of the federal aid program. 
4. In the event that a federal aid program is 
enacted which excludes children in private schools, these 
children will be the victims of discriminatory legislation. 
There will be no alternative but to oppose such 
discrimination. 27 
In a front page story, John Morris of the New York Times reported: 
The highest prelates of the Roman Catholic Church met 
here today to plan what is expected to be a vigorous fight 
against President Kennedy's school aid program. The 
hierarchy . . . has decided to oppose any school aid 
27Price, pp. 28-29. 
- ---~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
legislation that fails to help children attending private 
schools. . . . While the meeting was underway, President 
Kennedy repeated his opposition to any federal assistance 
for nonpublic schools.28 
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The press thus had its enticing conflict between Catholic Church and Catholic President. 
Not all of the press responded in the same manner. In his column, New York Times 
correspondent James Reston saw the bishops move as one •likely to hurt both religion 
and education.• But he went on to add that President Kennedy's insistence that "there 
isn't any room for debate on that subject [aid to parochial schools] ... merely envenoms 
the debate that is now obviously in progress."29 
No other issue in the 1960 campaign had played a more dominant role than the 
religion of John F. Kennedy. He convincingly made the case that he would not be 
influenced by the Church. But the claims of the Catholic Church on the issue of federal 
aid to education could not be ignored. Within the new administration, the question of 
federal aid to religious schools began to be discussed in private. Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare Abraham Ribicoff, one of the earliest Kennedy supporters, 
believed the school package could not pass "unless there was something in it for the 
Catholics. "30 
The same day, Ribicoff responded to Kennedy's request for information about the 
NDEA non-profit school loan procedure. Ribicoff noted that of the $20.4 million 
appropriated for fiscal years 1959-61, the schools had requested only $1.9 million. 31 
26New York Times, March 2, 1961. 
29New York Times, March 10, 1961. 
~icker, p. 125. 
31 Letter and Statement from Ribicoff to Kennedy, March 7, 1961, President's Office 
Files, Box 79A, JFK Papers, JFKL, pp. 1-2. 
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Kennedy could now argue that loans to parochial schools were not unconstitutional but 
unnecessary and unwanted. The same day Sorensen wrote to Kennedy, "My personal 
conviction is that the first Catholic President cannot now reverse his vote on the Morse 
Amendment in 1960, when he was a candidate, to support the first parochial aid school 
bill."32 
Yet at his March 8th press conference, the possibility of federal loans to parochial 
schools "took up almost a third of the time." Kennedy repeated that he felt there was no 
room for debate in regard to grants for parochial schools. He added, "my judgment has 
been that across-the-board loans are unconstitutional. "33 But the President retreated 
from his earlier position by saying, "there have been some kinds of loans to nonpublic 
schools which have been supported by the Congress and signed by the President and 
about which no constitution problem has yet been raised, and the NDEA is the best 
example. "34 Kennedy suggested that if Congress wanted to consider some type of loan 
program for nonpublic schools, it should be considered separately from the 
administration's proposals. 
As Time observed, "Kennedy's 'no' [to parochial school aid) was a shade softer 
than the 'noes' of his 1960 campaign."35 The President also appeared surprised and 
intimidated by the intensity of the attacks on his program. "I do not recall that [during the 
Eisenhower Administration] there was a great effort made ... to provide across the board 
32"Administration Position to Aid to Parochial Schools," March 7, 1961, Box 33, 
Sorensen Papers, JFKL, p. 2. 
33Price, p. 29. 
34Remarks at Presidential News Conference, March 8, 1961, Public Papers, Vol. 1961, 
pp. 155-56. 
35"Battle Over Schools," Time 77 (March 17, 1961), p. 12. 
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loans to an aid to education bill. "36 Kennedy maintained that across-the-board loans to 
parochial schools were unconstitutional. By these he meant loans that could be used 
for any purpose and by any school. But allowing for a possible compromise, he drew 
a clear distinction: "Special purpose loans for . . . building college classrooms or 
purchasing scientific equipment might be permissible." As a senator, he had supported 
the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which provided for just such special-purpose 
loans to private schools. He suggested, "There's obviously room for debate about loans 
because it's been debated."37 
While Kennedy retreated on the church-state question, the members of his 
administration privately sought a consistent position. On March 10th, an HEW 
memorandum examined several proposals for federal assistance to nonpublic schools. 
The report listed: 
(1] general federal loans for school construction; (2] limited 
federal loans for construction of non-instructional school 
facilities; (3] federal grants for ancillary school services; 
[and] [4] charting [a] federal financing corporation.38 
Other means of providing nonpublic school aid studied by the administration 
included grants to the states for "special education projects," a "loan program for all 
secular books in private and parochial schools," and the provision "for either loans or 
grants" to finance health services. 39 
36Remarks at Presidential News Conference, March 8, 1961 , Public Papers, Vol. 1961, 
p. 156. 
37Wicker, p. 138. 
38"Alternative Proposals for Federal Assistance to Nonprofit, Private Elementary and 
Secondary Schools," March 10, 1961, Box 33, Sorensen Papers, JFKL, pp. 1-3. 
39"The Education Bill--Constitutional Alternatives Which Include Catholics," undated, 
Box 33, Sorensen Papers, JFKL. 
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Although softening his position on aid to parochial schools, Kennedy maintained 
that any such provision in his general support measure would ensure the bill's defeat. 
On March 1oth, Senators Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana) and Wayne Morse 
(Democrat, Oregon) and Representatives Frank Thompson (Democrat, New Jersey) and 
Adam Clayton Powell (Democrat, New York) announced their support of a separate loan 
bill.40 At his March 15th news conference, Kennedy maintained that he "[would] be glad 
to cooperate with Congress in considering the matter of loans" but reiterated his hope 
of "passing the public school matter first. "41 
While Catholic and non-Catholic organizations prepared to flood members of 
Congress with their emotional reactions to the education issue, the Kennedy 
Administration sought a way out of the dilemma. HEW Secretary Ribicoff and Special 
White House Counsel Sorensen opened secret discussions with Bishop Hannon and 
Monsignors Tanner and Hurley of the NCWC. Out of these talks, a strategy emerged: 
the public school bill would proceed as planned, but the Congress, not the President, 
would initiate a private school loan program as an amendment to a measure extending 
the life of the National Defense Education Act.42 The expansion of Title Ill, Section 205 
of the NDEA would include nonpublic school loans for the construction of science, 
mathematics, foreign language, physical fitness, and lunch facilities. The "exact 
language" of the amendment would require NCWC approval.43 Ribicoff had wanted to 
40New York Times, March 11, 1961. 
41 "Remarks at Presidential News Conference, March 15, 1961, Public Papers, Vol. 
1961, p. 184. 
42Sundquist, p. 190. 
43Memorandum from Sorensen to Kennedy, April 12, 1961, Box 33, Sorensen Papers, 
JFKL, pp. 1-2. 
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"leave the door open" for Congress, and in the event of "heavy Catholic pressure," to 
adopt one of the "means for giving something to the Catholics. "44 
But for a Catholic president to appear to be a party to such an agreement would 
be political suicide. So Sorensen closed his "administratively confidential" memo with the 
promise that "there was to be no mention or indication that the Administration had played 
any role or taken any position on this amendment or course of strategy."45 Accordingly, 
on April 25th, President Kennedy formally recommended the extension of the NDEA, with 
the "pointed suggested ... also appropriate that the Congress consider other proposals" 
as amendments. 46 The President, who throughout his campaign, and as late as March 
1st, had vehemently rejected the bishops' position, had quietly joined their side. 
Although he had vacillated on education issues in his Congressional career; "the rapidity 
and degree of his reversals were quite startling. "47 
Kennedy's decision to privately acquiesce was unquestionably political. He 
realized the bishops' power base of the urban north coincided with his. If he offended 
the NCWC, it might jeopardize his support among Catholic congressmen and the 
representatives of largely Catholic constituencies. Roughly four out of five Catholic voters 
chose Kennedy in 1960. Now these same supporters were besieging the White House 
and the Congress with mail demanding justice for their children. 
44Wicker, p. 128. 
45Memorandum from Sorensen to Kennedy, April 12, 1961, Box 33, Sorensen Papers, 
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Kennedy's new position signalled Congress to proceed with his comprehensive 
bill while acting separately on NDEA amendments. Described as a "strategy of 
subtraction," the administration sought to "deflect the controversy over parochial aid by 
removing it from the general aid bill and shifting it to the NDEA bill."48 Acceptance of 
this strategy required the confidence and approval of key Catholic democrats in the 
House. If they questioned his motives or disagreed with Kennedy's two-bill approach, 
the strategy would fail. 
In addition, Protestant Wayne Morse, senate sponsor of the Kennedy elementary 
and secondary education bill, and Jewish Abraham Ribicoff, from predominantly Catholic 
Connecticut, were strong advocates of parochial school assistance. But with 
Commissioner of Education Sterling McMurrin's minimal political interest and influence 
and Kennedy's continued absorption in crisis, Sorensen virtually stood alone in 
attempting to check the pro-Catholic sentiment engulfing the White House. When 
"Sorensen caved in,• as one Congressional source described it, the President 
retreated.49 
Short of placing himself in a no win situation, and given the frequency and 
intensity of his campaign statements on the subject, Kennedy could have simply 
consulted with the NCWC prior to his education message. Lyndon Johnson would do 
so before issuing his similar position on the issue in the 1964 Presidential campaign. 
This enabled Johnson to avoid the political firestorm which surrounded John Kennedy. 
Monsignor Hurley stated that prior to the election and after Kennedy took office, there 
48Alan Shank, Presidential Policy Leadership: Kennedy and Social Welfare (University 
Press of America, 1980), p. 106. 
49wicker, p. 139. 
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were several attempts by the NCWC to set up a discussion with Kennedy's staff. "I think 
they first considered we were nothing, we weren't that powerful a group, and we weren't. 
. . . We wanted to avoid a head-on collision. . . . He [Kennedy] miscalculated, his staff 
miscalculated. "50 
Another possible solution had been suggested by the editor who reported 
Cardinal Spellman's views on education for Time in January. He believed one possible 
solution would be to give "direct grants to Catholic students, patterned after the G.I. 
Bill. "51 Although not pursued by the administration, this system was later used in the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to address the problem. 
Despite Kennedy's.denial, the press saw through the transparent strategy of using 
the NDEA revision to aid parochial schools. In an editorial, the New York Times charged 
that the NDEA revision in Congress was "dominated by efforts to write into this legislation 
provisions for aid to private and parochial schools," which were •now being used as a 
cover under which there is an attempt to slip through large-scale Federal aid to nonpublic 
schools."52 
Whatever the motivations, one quickly consumed the others. Congressional 
leadership was most concerned about the politics of the Kennedy decision. Ultimately, 
the Kennedy general support bill's legislative journey would begin in Congressional 
committees and end in turmoil. 
Shortly after receiving word of the compromise, Senators Clark of Pennsylvania 
and Morse of Oregon informed the White House of their opposition to a combined 
50McAndrews, p. 182. 
51 Muncie, p. 151. 
52New York Times, June 20, 1961. 
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package. Senator Morse joined with Democratic Congressman Frank Thompson of New 
Jersey in saying that joint consideration of the two bills "would only have the effect of 
killing all aid to education."53 This represented a rejection of pressure from the 
Administration by Secretary Ribicoff, Majority Leader Mansfield and liaison coordinator 
O'Brien, for joint consideration of both general aid and NDEA amendments. But Morse, 
Thompson, and other Congressmen, along with NEA, "all feared that the parochial loan 
issue, even in its narrowest form, might kill the public support bill."54 
The Senate conducted hearings on the revised NDEA in April and May, the House 
in June. In an early exchange with the Kennedy's bill sponsor, Senator Wayne Morse, 
Monsignor Hochwalt conveyed his opinion that a separate parochial loan bill "wouldn't 
have much of a chance.• Morse replied, "I would be rather inclined to hold tenaciously 
to the point of view you just expressed,• though he promised to support such a measure 
after a public school bill had passed.55 Metcalf of Montana, Ribicoff, and O'Brien 
agreed that the Kennedy compromise was simply bad politics. 56 The three Senators 
had determined that the votes simply were not there. Only 36 percent of the American 
people advocated federal aid to parochial schools. 57 Non-Catholics comprised 88 
percent of the Senate and 80 percent of the House.58 Monsignor Tanner wrote, "Many 
53Shank, p. 107. 
54Price, p. 149. 
55Bendiner, p. 184. 
56New York Times, May 17, 1961. 
57Philip Meranto, The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 1965: A Study in Political 
Innovation (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1967), p. 46. 
58"Religious Affiliations of Members of Congress," Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report 19 (April 7, 1961), pp. 626-628. 
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Catholics in the Senate and House are committed to federal aid." In late May he 
conceded, "we simply do not have the votes for parochial school aid."59 
On May 11th, the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee approved revisions 
of the general aid bill by a 12-2 vote with Senators Goldwater of Arizona and Dirksen of 
Illinois in opposition. 
Floor debate on S.1021 began in the Senate on May 16th. In his explanation of 
the bill, Morse unexpectedly reversed himself by stipulating that nonpublic as well as 
public school pupils contribute to the equalization arrangement of the legislation. Morse 
argued, "Every child in a state is an educational burden to the state in the sense that the 
state has responsibilities toward every child ... whether the child goes to a public school 
or a private school.• Using such examples as fire protection, lunch programs, and other 
auxiliary services, Morse noted that "the states already give considerable assistance to 
children who go to private schools. "60 Morse's remarks attempting to garner support 
for parochial school aid would prove to be an exercise in brevity. 
The following day Senators Willis Randolph of West Virginia and Frank Lausche 
of Ohio attacked Morse's allocation formula. Lausche offered an amendment to restore 
the Kennedy plan of counting only public school students. He maintained on May 24th 
that the intent of his amendment was to "ensure that the Senate had guarded against 
bringing the needs of parochial schools into question."61 By a 61-32 margin, the Senate 
dismissed the parochial loan amendment. 
59McAndrews, p. 184. 
60Congressional Record, May 16, 1961 , p. 8060. 
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On May 25th, the Senate passed S.1021, the general school aid as a separate 
measure without the NDEA bill or the parochial school amendment. The vote was 49-34, 
with Democrats voting for it 41-12 and Republicans against it 22-8.62 The bill 
appropriated $2.5 billion for operation, maintenance, and construction of public schools 
and for teachers' salaries. The Senate had done its work, developing a consensus on 
the religious issue because, as Hugh Douglas Price wrote, "compromise was 
accomplished within most Senators themselves, but would have to be negotiated 
between members in the House."63 
The House was another matter. The House "had always been the graveyard for 
federal aid to education. "64 The Senate has constituencies comprised of entire states. 
Within many states, there are areas of Protestant and Catholic voting strength. However, 
many House members represent small districts which are often relatively homogeneous. 
Compromise in the House over aid to parochial schools would have to be between 
legislators representing districts with a higher concentration of Catholics and those 
representatives in the predominantly Protestant districts. This became a crucial problem 
in the House Rules Committee when appeals for party loyalty were met by responses to 
constituency pressure. 
The test of the Kennedy program on the House floor would not come unless it first 
survived the notorious House Rules Committee. The committee would have six new 
members in 1961. More importantly, the eight-man "Rayburn majority" in the Rules 
62Muncie, p. 154. 
63Price, pp. 51-52. 
64 Julie Roy Jeffrey, Education for the Poor: A Study of the Origins and Implementation 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1976), p. 62. 
79 
Committee included three Catholic Democrats: Ray Madden of Indiana, James Delaney 
of New York, and Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (who represented John F. Kennedy's old Boston-
Cambridge district in Massachusetts). The enlargement of the committee was thought 
to have insured a favorable vote on the Kennedy plan. But without the cooperation of 
the three Catholic Democrats, the Administration bill could not be cleared. 
April would represent a difficult month for the Kennedy Administration. Not only 
were communist forces in Laos continuing to advance, but the American supported 
Cuban counter-revolution at the Bay of Pigs failed. Both represented major setbacks to 
the President. Kennedy was also involved in deciding what was negotiable with 
Khrushchev in the Berlin crisis. All of these problems had flared up as the President and 
his supporters in Congress were involved in a series of maneuvers over the parochial 
school issue. 
The House subcommittee hearings on the NDEA had begun rather uneasily when 
Dr. Sterling McMurrin, the new Commissioner of Education, declined to take an official 
stand on the proposals for aid to nonpublic schools. Neither the President nor Secretary 
Ribicoff appeared very anxious to be committed to support of aid to parochial schools. 
Foreign policy issues dominated the President's attention, while the education issue 
might prove damaging to Secretary Ribicoff's availability for nomination "to a seat on the 
Supreme Court, should a vacancy occur. "65 
On May 24th, the Committee on Education and Labor approved an aid bill by a 
straight party vote of 18 Democrats to 13 Republicans. Chairman Adam Clayton Powell 
resisted efforts to include either an antisegregation amendment or to add special purpose 
classroom construction aid for private schools. The Committee Republicans unanimously 
65Price, p. 61 . 
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opposed the bill as "unwarranted federal intrusion into matters properly of local and state 
concern" that would "subsidize the nation's teachers" leading to an "increasing interest 
in what teachers teach."66 This position simply echoed previous Republican arguments. 
For example, Richard Nixon had made the same statements throughout his Presidential 
campaign, including the first televised debate with then Senator Kennedy. 
However, Republican opposition did not prove to be the fatal blow to Kennedy's 
education bill. Rather, it would be the unresponsiveness of the reformed Rules 
Committee to Kennedy's first major piece of domestic legislation. A majority of the Rules 
Committee were firmly opposed to any parochial aid. Three Southern Democrats who 
usually sided with Speaker Rayburn--James Trimble of Arkansas, Homer Thornberry of 
Texas, and Carl Elliot of Alabama-were under pressure to oppose any nonpublic aid.67 
Added to these three were Chairman Smith of Virginia and William Colmer of Mississippi 
who opposed both parochial aid and the Administration's bill. The five Republicans were 
similarly opposed to both public and private aid. This left the three Catholic Democrats-
Madden, O'Neill, and Delaney--as crucial to the Administration's educational bill. 
On June 20th, the Rules Committee, meeting in executive session, voted to 
postpone its consideration of the public school bill until the conclusion of the hearings 
on the NDEA. The five Republicans, in addition to Smith and Colmer, resorted to various 
delaying tactics, in the hopes of scheduling federal aid off the calendar. Catholic 
Democrats O'Neill and Delaney served notice to have the House vote on the amended 
NDEA before it considered the public school bill.68 A week later, a 19-11 majority of the 
661961 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 224. 
67Shank, pp. 110-11. 
68New York Times, June 21, 1961. 
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House Education and Labor Committee reported the revised NDEA. The committee 
rejected amendments proposed by Representative Quie of Minnesota to eliminate 
parochial school loans and to attach an antisegregation rider. It did adopt New Jersey 
Representative Frelinghuysen's motion to limit the cost of parochial school loans to $125 
million for three years. 
Although none of the three measures (the public school bill, the NDEA expansion, 
and aid to higher education) had been cleared by the Rules Committee, they had been 
discussed on the floor of the House. On May 2nd, Representative Frelinghuysen spoke 
on the education program during the first one hundred days of the Kennedy 
Administration. On June 29th, Frelinghuysen was recognized for two hours to present 
a "Report on American Education" prepared by the House Republic Policy Committee. 69 
Opposition to federal aid seemed to be mounting outside Congress also. At the 
annual Governor's Conference in Honolulu, a resolution opposing aid to teachers' 
salaries was narrowly defeated by a 24-23 vote. Included in the majority vote were three 
territorial governors appointed by the President. On the same day, Republican House 
leader Charles Halleck read a letter from former President Eisenhower strongly opposing 
the Administration's aid to education proposal. Appearing on a weekly televised report 
of the Republican House and Senate leaders, Halleck quoted Eisenhower's warning that 
the proposals "would ultimately result in federal control of education. "7° Fears of federal 
control had also been fueled by the ill-timed release of a 60-page HEW pamphlet entitled 
"A Federal Education Agency of the Future. "71 
69Price, pp. 63-64. 
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President Kennedy, who had just returned from his European meetings with 
DeGaulle and Khrushchev, received the bad news at his regular Tuesday morning 
meeting with Congressional leaders. Informally, Rayburn reportedly privately told 
Kennedy the education bill was "as dead as slavery.• For the public, however, Rayburn 
would only indicate that the "bill is in trouble. "72 
After the House Education and Labor Committee's 19-11 vote, Chairman Powell 
remarked there •was so much controversy that someone's got to blow the whistle" on the 
warring factions. 73 That someone was President Kennedy. The "absence of presidential 
leadership seriously threatened House approval" of either general aid or the NDEA 
amendments. 74 His intervention in the congressional battle could prove decisive. The 
White House wanted to change the votes of Rules members Delaney and O'Neill. Their 
votes had resulted in the Rules Committee delaying action of June 20. As it turned out, 
only O'Neill could be persuaded to change his vote. Delaney had indicated in early July 
that he would provide the vote to block federal aid when he said all three bills being 
considered should be replaced with a non-discriminatory measure. 75 All efforts to 
change Delaney's vote failed. 
On July 18, 1961, Representative Colmer suggested that the Rules Committee 
table all three of the education bills. By an 8-7 margin, the committee passed Colmer's 
motion and in an afternoon of acrimony killed Kennedy's education program. The 
deciding vote cast by Delaney provided the margin of difference, along with "Judge" 
72lbid, p. 62. 
731961 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 224. 
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Smith, Coler and the five Republicans. Larry O'Brien, Kennedy's Congressional liaison, 
wrote that despite pressure from the White House, 
Nothing could change Delaney's mind. Ribicoff and I 
talked to him, many times, to no avail. The President had 
at least two long, off-the-record talks with him in which he 
tried desperately to bring Delaney around, but Jim was 
adamant.76 
The reason for Delaney's decision was clear: the religious issue. In an interview, 
Delaney stated: "I voted against the bill principally because it [the general support 
measure] was a discriminatory bill. I don't believe in a single, monolithic system of 
education."77 Newsweek quoted an unnamed member of the House Education and 
Labor Committee as saying, "The NCWC shot the bill down, if it didn't kill it altogether. "78 
A week before the Delaney vote, the New Republic observed, "If the desperately needed 
school bill fails in Congress much of the responsibility will be with the Catholic 
hierarchy. "79 
While the press continued to emphasize the church-state conflict, the reality 
behind the Rules Committee vote was quite different. Delaney was the only member of 
the 15 who voted for religious reasons. Other Catholic Democrats on the committee--Ray 
Madden of Indiana and Thomas P. O'Neill of Massachusetts-voted against the tabling 
motion, as did Bible Belt Democrats James Trimble, Carl Elliot, and Homer Thornberry. 
76Laurence F. O'Brien, The Final Victories: A Life in Politics fro-;,, John F. Kennedy to 
Watergate (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), p. 127. 
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While Delaney did cast the decisive vote, his vote was truly his own. He 
maintained, "I did not consult any member of the [Catholic] hierarchy before making up 
my mind how to vote in the Rules Committee, "80 and the evidence supports his 
assertion. The NCWC had been working for four months to enact the NDEA expansion. 
Monsignor Hochwalt's Senate testimony defended the NDEA proposal. Although 
Hochwalt "refused to commit himself to the Administration bill in the House Hearings, . 
. . the bishops were still behind the Kennedy legislation. "81 The key was Delaney who 
reflected Catholic fears that "federal aid for public school teachers' salaries posed 
potentially ruinous competition for poorly paid Catholic lay teachers. "82 
Moreover, Delaney had very little confidence that if he "approved the public school 
bill, the private school-NDEA bill would survive as a separate measure."83 Delaney 
"concluded, and no doubt rightly, that once he agreed to the public school bill, the NDEA 
bill would be mutilated or killed."84 Many members of the House did not want the 
responsibility of voting on the two bills, which by then had generated hundreds of 
thousands of messages from their constituents. A southern member was quoted as 
saying, "When Delaney cast his vote, you could hear a sigh of relief all over the Capitol, 
and Congressmen were shaking Delaney's hand for hours afterward. "85 
80Coravon, ed., "Interview with Congressman Delaney," p. 663. 
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Kennedy was aware that religion had played a minor role in the Rules Committee 
defeat. A briefing paper for his July 19th news conference noted, "No amount of 
Presidential leadership could change the five Republicans and two Dixiecrats who do not 
support the ticket anyway, or the one Catholic Democrat to whom every kind of appeal 
was made."86 At his news conference, Kennedy observed that "seven of those eight 
votes came from members of Congress who were not sympathetic to the legislation, nor 
supported me in the last election. "87 
Despite having all three of the Administration's major education bills bottled up 
in the House Rules Committee, Kennedy did not want to admit defeat. Two days after 
the House Rules debacle, HEW Secretary Ribicoff presented Kennedy with possible 
compromises that would enable the Administration to claim "something significant in the 
education field this year, and would defer the co~troversial issues until a later date."88 
Kennedy chose a combination of Ribicoff's legislative packages: a one-year 
continuation of impacted area aid and an unamended NDEA, construction of schools in 
areas with severe enrollment problems and a college aid bill. 89 The Kennedy decision 
shared by Ribicoff and several Congressmen omitted the two most troublesome features 
of the original Kennedy bill in the House Education and Labor Committee: aid for 
teachers' salaries and permanent. federal support. Kennedy accepted the compromise 
proposal and Congressman Thompson introduced it as HR 8890. A second bill, HR 
86Statement for Kennedy, undated, Box 33, Sorensen Papers, JFKL, p. 6. 
87"The President's News Conference of July 19, 1961," Public Papers, Vol. 1961, p. 
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8900, covered the Administration's proposals for $1.5 billion in loans and grants for 
higher education. 
A draft of the new Kennedy bill, presented to the White House by Wilbur Cohen 
on August 7th, received a hostile response from Congressional leaders. 90 Speaker 
Rayburn objected to the inclusion of the higher education bill on the grounds that it might 
jeopardize the success of the bill. On August 14th, Sorensen urged the President to 
forestall Congressional criticism on impacted aid and the NDEA with an appeal to the 
Democratic leadership to accept "the compromise measure advanced by Secretary 
Ribicoff. "91 Sorensen also outlined several possible arguments for the President when 
he met with Congressional leaders. He should maintain that the first Catholic president 
could not easily sign the NDEA and college aid bills, with their allowance for nonpublic 
schools, without enacting a public school bill. He should admit the damage that the 
education battle was exacting on his reputation and leadership abilities. He should 
emphasize that the Ribicoff compromise was the best possible alternative to another 
round of turmoil which smothered the original bill.92 
In discussions with Sam Rayburn, Sorensen urged Kennedy to stress the omission 
of teacher's salaries. With John McCormack, he might emphasize the inclusion of 
parochial schools in the NDEA. To Mike Mansfield, he could argue the necessity of 
employing the aid to impacted areas and the N DEA as a means to obtain the 
90Memorandum and Preliminary Draft of Emergency Educational Aid Act of 1961 from 
Cohen to Kennedy, August 7, 1961, Box 32, Sorensen Papers, JFKL, pp. 1-2. 
91 Memorandum from Sorensen to Kennedy, August 14, 1961, Box 32, Sorensen 
Papers, JFKL, pp. 1-2. 
92Memorandum from Sorensen to Kennedy, August 15, 1961, Box 32, Sorensen 
Papers, JFKL, pp. 1-2. 
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construction bill. And to Hubert Humphrey there would be an appeal to withhold criticism 
of this diluted approach.93 
Kennedy's appeal succeeded, as the party leadership emerged from the meeting 
determined to support the President's program. In his report to the President on the 
meeting, Senator Morse urged Kennedy to meet with the entire Education Subcommittee 
Democratic contingent (Morse, Hill, Randolph, Clark, McNamara) to "boost their 
enthusiasm, and demonstrate Presidential interest and leadership. "94 
But President Kennedy was not inclined to directly intervene in the education 
struggle. During late July and August he focused on winning congressional approval for 
his controversial program for long-term financing of foreign aid. Members of the House 
Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committee's "rather than those involved in 
the education fight, were invited to the White House. •95 
An August 14th memorandum from Sorensen warned Kennedy that 
There is no real possibility of the bill receiving approval 
without clearing the House Rules Committee. This means 
that it must receive the support of either Congressman 
Delaney or a Republican member. 96 
Kennedy hoped to bypass the Rules Committee and get a direct vote from the full House. 
He had suggested as much as his July 19th news conference. Kennedy stated, "the 
members of Congress who support this will use these procedures which are available to 
93lbid, pp. 1-2. 
94Memorandum from Sorensen to Kennedy, August 17, 1961, Box 32, Sorensen 
Papers, JFKL. 
95Price, p. 65. 
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them under the rules of the House to bring this to a vote. "97 The procedure Kennedy 
referred to was the seldom-used Parliamentary procedure of Calendar Wednesday. 
Designed to circumvent the House Rules Committee structure in an emergency, debate 
would begin and end on the same day. 
Congressman Frank Thompson, House sponsor of Kennedy's first elementary and 
secondary education bill, foresaw a "reasonable chance• for passage of his second. On 
August 16th, Kennedy, Ribicoff, and the Democrats on the House Education and Labor 
Committee all urged Congressman Delaney to accept HR 8890. The President assured 
Delaney that aid for teachers' salaries would not be added to the bill. 98 Delaney called 
the construction measure reasonable, but stopped short of endorsing it. But two weeks 
prior to the 1961 vote, Delaney expressed satisfaction that the Ribicoff compromise had 
removed permanent federal support. 99 
On August 24th, Speaker Rayburn told the President that because he did not think 
Howard Smith's Rules Committee would promptly report the bill, he would offer it to the 
House via the Calendar Wednesday procedure. 
Five days later, the House Education and Labor Committee reported the 
legislation, again sponsored by Congressman Thompson, on a straight party vote of 16-
12. But the Administration's compromise satisfied no one. This watered-down one-year 
"emergency" school construction bill was "denounced by Catholics as discriminatory, by 
97"The Presidential News Conference of July 19, 1961," Public Papers, Vol. 1961, p. 
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the NEA as inadequate, and by the House Republicans as a railroad job."100 The bill 
was rushed through the House Education and Labor Committee, with discussion limited 
to 70 minutes. Republican Congressman Frelinghuysen described the Republican 
opposition. He charged the Democrats with an "inexcusable abuse of the legislative 
process in the way this bill was submitted to our committee for consideration.0101 The 
following day, August 30th, was Calendar Wednesday. 
On Wednesday, August 30th, Chairman Adam Clayton Powell moved that the 
House consider HR 8890. It did by overwhelmingly rejecting it 242-170. The defeat 
consisted of 160 Republicans, 70 Southern Democrats, and 12 non-Southern Democrats. 
The higher education companion bill, HR 8900, was then sent to the Rules Committee, 
where it remained buried. Of the 22 Republicans who left their party on the Rules 
Committee expansion, 19 returned to the fold to defeat HR 8900. 102 Federal aid was 
dead. The New York Times editorial of September 6th stated the "failure of leadership 
in the White House, in the Department of HEW, and in the House of Representatives 
gives little cause for hope. Compromise has been the order of the day, and the result 
has been a fiasco for Federal aid to education. •103 
The final blow came when both houses passed a bill extending impacted area aid 
and the unamended NDEA for two years. Kennedy had hoped both would be renewed 
for one year while attempting to link both programs to his general aid legislation. On 
October 3rd, a few hours before a pocket veto would have killed the measure, Kennedy, 
100Graham, p. 24. 
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with "extreme reluctance" signed the "unsound and uneconomical"104 bills intc iaw. The 
first-year efforts of the most education-conscious president in American history had 
lessened the chances for federal aid. An editorial in the Catholic journal, Commonweal, 
summed up the plight of federal aid to education: "The safest statement one can make 
about the recent debate ... is that it began in confusion and ended in hysteria. •105 
1041bid, October 4, 1961. 
10511Aid to Education," Commonweal 75, (November 3, 1961). p. 140. 
CHAPTERV 
"WE'LL BE BACK NEXT YEAR" 
At his press conference following the Calendar Wednesday fiasco, Kennedy 
observed that "everyone is for education but they're all for a different bill. . . . So we will 
be back next year. "1 
A combination of uncontrollable and controllable forces drove Kennedy to defeat 
on federal aid to education. His religion, his party affiliation, his narrow Presidential 
victory, his slender Congressional majority, and the problems of the Cold War abroad 
were matters over which he had little sway. But he could regulate his relations with the 
educational groups and Congress, as well as his strategy for federal aid for education. 
While Kennedy might not have been able to unite the education lobbies, he could have 
done less to divide them. By excluding the NCWC and the NAACP from the formulation 
of his original education program, and in retreating from the NEA and AFT positions, 
Kennedy had at various times alienated all major education lobbies. 
Who killed federal aid? In describing the educational failure, newspapers and 
editorials suggested that the religious issue had killed the bill. But as Kennedy was 
himself aware, the Administration's inability to pass federal aid was more complex than 
the papers reported. The religious issue was a dramatic one, but the roll call vote 
revealed that 90 percent of the Catholic Democrats in the House backed H. R. 8890. 2 
1"The Presidential News Conference of 1961," Public Papers, Vol. 1961, p. 574. 
2Meranto, p. 94. 
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It was easy to blame the Roman Catholic Church for the defeat of the first bill and, as 
many Democrats did, to blame the Republicans for the loss of the second. 
Federal aid for teachers' salaries and permanent federal support killed the initial 
bill. A majority of the House and House Rules Committee opposed both. The House 
Republican Policy Committee estimated in August 1961 that had the Kennedy bill 
survived the Rules Committee, up to 90 percent of House Republicans would have 
opposed it on the floor.3 
The unnecessary Parliamentary maneuver of Calendar Wednesday killed H. R. 
8890. A majority of the House and House Rules Committee would likely have approved 
it had it been open to debate and possible amendment in committee or on the floor. A 
needless climate of partisanship, established by Kennedy and fueled by House Minority 
Leader Hallack, killed federal aid while leaving a feeling of recrimination not soon to end. 
Wilbur Cohen believed that H.R. 8890 was "rushed into a vote without adequate 
consideration and preparation."4 Ribicoff, in an October memorandum, conceded that 
H. R. 8890 was "rushed to the floor under circumstances where many Republicans could 
say they never had a chance to see it. "5 
In the area of federal aid to education, Kennedy acted as if he had won a 
landslide victory, and Congress had ridden in on his coattails. But such an idea defied 
reality as did his first education proposal and the legislative strategy accompanying his 
second. Mrs. Jim Bolling, wife of Democratic Congressman Richard Bolling and member 
3James Deakin, "Very, Very Educational," New Republic 45 (August 7, 1961), p. 13. 
4Letter from Cohen to Hugh Davis Graham, April 20, 1981, attached to interview of 
Wilbur Cohen by Charles T. Morrissey, November 11, 1964, p. 41. 
5Memorandum from Ribicoff to Kennedy, October 6, 1961, Presidential Office Files, 
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of the Congressional liaison staff of Kennedy's HEW, discussed the atmosphere in which 
Sorensen, Cohen, and others devised the first bill: 
They had the Hovde Report and thought it would be great 
to have an education bill. I think a lot of this was "My God, 
we've won. It's marvelous. We're going to have an 
education bill," without too much thought really how hard 
it would be to get it. . . . I think that they were more taken 
with the substance than they were with what their political 
problems were. 6 
They also displayed a certain arrogance, as if "they could make the legislation and cram 
it down the Committee's throat. Well, there's a resistance to that."7 
As the first Catholic president, Kennedy was politically condemned to oppose 
parochial school aid in his elementary and secondary school program. But his secret 
encouragement of the NDEA "proposal" for Catholics opened his administration to 
charges of duplicity and ineptness. It backfired on him and his repeated denials were 
not resourceful. Congressman Frank Thompson who had sponsored both Kennedy 
education bills in the House recalled a meeting in which aid to parochial schools had 
been discussed. With the President, Thompson, Ribicoff, and Sorensen, Kennedy "took 
the position that under no circumstances should we cave in on the issue and give aid 
directly to parochial schools.• In responding to a question about how clear the President 
had been on the provisions of the bill, Thompson answered, "No. I wasn't sure when I 
left the meeting just what his position was."8 
6Transcript, "Jim Grant Bolling Oral History Interview," March 1, 1966, JFKL, pp. 28, 
47. 
71bid, p. 46. 
8Transcript, "Frank Thompson Oral History Interview," March 1 O, 1965, JFKL, p. 19. 
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By revising his stand on parochial aid, Kennedy abandoned a principle "that he 
himself had insisted upon."9 By doing so, he reduced the confidence of legislators 
supporting his general aid bill. Kennedy's ability to lead Congress was called into 
question when he shifted the burden from the White House to Capitol Hill to resolve the 
religious issue. As one western liberal noted before the vote, "I was willing to die for the 
education bill. But there's been so much maneuvering and so much controversy that I 
don't care anymore. •10 
The President's policy of cautious liberalism proved disappointing after the brave 
rhetoric of the campaign. Kennedy's press secretary Pierre Salinger wrote that the 
President "had bold aid controversial concepts for moving the nation ahead that had to 
be sold both to the Congress and the public, and no one could sell them more effectively 
than he."11 Yet in the education field, his immense popularity became a wasted 
resource. His education program became a postponed promise rather than a fulfilled 
campaign pledge. 
Kennedy also never mastered the Hill. He came from the Senate, "where training 
is in compromise and adjustment rather than in the exercise of executive talents. •12 
Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania noted that Kennedy was "not very deft with 
9wicker, p. 145. 
1°Fuller, p. 101. 
11 Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1966), p. 129. 
12Carroll Kilpatrick, "The Kennedy Style and Congress," Virginia Quarterly Review, 
(Winter 1963). 
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Congress ... he never considered himself in and of the Congress ... he was too willing 
to compromise on ... many occasions .... He was never willing to declare war."13 
Lawrence O'Brien felt the President should be protected from becoming overly 
involved. "I'm overcautious about overextending him .... I try to avoid using him with 
Congressmen; there are too many demands already on his time." While Kennedy did call 
frequently during the Rules Committee fight, on the whole, the White House resisted 
employing this tactic. "We discovered that we have to keep him off the phone when 
things get tough. •14 With this there was a contrast between the gallant expectations and 
the cautious operation of the administration. In it Kennedy appeared to make a display 
more for the record than for the anticipated results. 
The fact that Delaney had been allowed to sink the most important part of the new 
President's legislative program and "escape unscathed" showed that the President "could 
be defied with impunity."15 Significantly, many Congressmen lost their respect for him 
while others lost their fear. 
A serious omission by the Kennedy Administration was not in calling upon liberal 
Republican Congressmen such as Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey and others in 
planning its legislative program. A liberal Republican described the fate of the second 
measure in a June 1961 interview with the Wall Street Journal: "They [the Kennedy 
13Transcript, "Joseph Clark Oral History Interview," December 15, 1965, JFKL, pp. 61, 
86. 
14Abraham Holtzman, Legislative Liaison: Executive Leadership in Congress (New 
York: Rand McNally and Company, 1970), p. 247. 
15wicker, p. 146. 
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Administration] never talk to us [moderate and liberal Republicans] to ask our advice. 
They took us for granted and now they don't have us."16 
It was perhaps fitting that Kennedy, whose years in Congress were marked by 
frequent shifts on federal aid to education, should inherit the leadership of a movement 
in transition. In the first year of his Presidency, Kennedy saw permanent support as a 
way to correct a temporary crisis. He finished the year by pragmatically returning to a 
position he had adhered to prior to his Presidency. 
1962: IN RETREAT OR IN HIDING? 
In his otherwise favorable assessment of the Kennedy presidency, Irving Bernstein 
has written, "if the theme of federal aid for education in 1961 was defeat, in 1962 it 
became fragmentation. "17 There were so many proposals circulating around Capitol Hill 
that it was difficult to tell them apart. Also, aside from the religious issue, the supporters 
of federal aid fought among themselves. 
At the beginning of his second year as President, Kennedy confronted the 
dilemma of whether to press the battle for general support or surrender to the odds. He 
chose to do neither. 
On October 6, 1961 , Ribicoff sent Kennedy a five page postmortem memo which 
analyzed the failure of 1961 and suggested he amend the NDEA with a new bill, the 
Emergency Educational Opportunities Act of 1962, which would fund teacher aid and 
training, improvements in educational quality, and emergency school construction for one 
16Wa// Street Journal, June 29, 1961. 
171rving Bernstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy's New Frontier (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 234. 
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year to school districts with demonstrated need. Ribicoff argued that "a broad program 
of grants to states for public construction and teachers' salaries is virtually impossible to 
pass. "18 He urged Kennedy to abandon such a state grant program, or at least 
postpone it until 1963, and press instead in 1962 for the higher education bill and the 
medical professions bill: 
Then face squarely the fact that a general aid bill for 
construction and teachers' salaries has been killed by the 
House Rules Committee and cannot be enacted by this 
Congress, make this an issue for the '62 elections with a 
commitment to press for it in '63, but insist that the needs 
are so great that some steps must be taken now. 19 
The President may have agreed with this shrewd advice, but he did not take it. 
An early January meeting between Kennedy and Congressional leaders of both parties 
designed to heal partisan conflict addressed reciprocal trade, foreign aid, civil defense, 
postal rates, federal pay raises, and the United Nations bond issues, but not 
education.20 So when Kennedy, in his State of the Union message on January 11, 
1962, announced that he would continue to push for enactment of his failed 1961 
legislation (long since buried in Judge Smith's Rules Committee graveyard), he began 
and ended his legislative campaign for general elementary and secondary education 
legislation. 
Instead, Kennedy began a move into other areas of education, indicating a shift 
in the terms of the educational debate. He unveiled a plan to improve the nation's 
18Memorandum from Ribicoff to Kennedy, October 6, 1961, Presidential Office Files, 
Box 79A, JFK Papers, JFKL, p. 4. 
19lbid, p. 9. 
20Memorandum from Sorensen to Kennedy, January 6, 1962, President's Office Files, 
Box 50, JFK Papers, JFKL. 
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scientific capacity through federal funding for instructional materials, laboratories, and 
additional National Science Foundation institutes for mathematics and science teachers. 
He also introduced a plan for adult literacy through the federal support of adult 
education, as well as schooling for the children of migratory farm workers, the expansion 
of educational television, and to increase special education for the handicapped. 
In the same address, Kennedy argued that the federal government's task was not 
merely to ensure education, but to enhance it. With his accent on "educational quality" 
and his assertion of a "proper Federal role of assistance and leadership,• Kennedy for the 
first time articulated an argument for permanent federal support which omitted dubious 
statistics and alarming projections.21 As Laurence McAndrews has observed, "it 
remained for Kennedy, and others, to resolve the contradiction between his diagnosis of 
an emergency and his prescription for a permanent federal presence in education. •22 
But it became clear that the Kennedy administration's strategy for 1962 was 
seriously flawed. As one historian of education, Hugh Davis Graham, has suggested, by 
pressing for the aid to both lower and higher education bills in 1962, Kennedy was 
"risking mutual contamination by the religious and partisan controversies. •23 Kennedy's 
message had clearly upset some of the estimates of his own supporters, who had hoped 
that he would delay any drive for elementary and secondary school aid until 1963. At the 
same time, some educators were dismayed that persons close to the White House were 
indicating that the President was determined to settle other parts of the package, without 
21 John F. Kennedy, "Special Message on Education, February 6, 1962," Public Papers 
of the Presidents of the United States, Vol. 1962 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1963), pp. 110-114. 
22McAndrews, p. 263. 
23Graham, p. 29. 
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action on aid to the public and secondary schools. Whatever the sincerity of Kennedy's 
intentions, Congress basically ignored his general-aid bill. 
Worse, the administration fell into disarray. When Kennedy disregarded Ribicoff's 
advice on education policy for 1962, Ribicoff cast his eyes on a Senate seat from 
Connecticut, and in July of 1962, he resigned to run for (and win) that seat. Wilbur 
Cohen's recollections are not flattering: 
Ribicoff left because, first he is a political animal; he is not 
an administrator . . . he was in fact an extremely poor 
administrator; one of the poorest we had as Secretary of 
HEW. . . . He was interested particularly in his own political 
future. He was very self-centered and egotistical. 24 
Ribicoff was replaced by Mayor Anthony Celebrezze of Cleveland. According to 
Cohen, while he turned out to be a very good secretary, he was picked because of his 
credentials as an Italian-American to help Ted Kennedy's race for the Senate in 
Massachusetts. On July 27th, Sterling McMurin, the Commissioner at the Office of 
Education, resigned, and was not succeeded by Francis Keppel until December. 
Dr. McMurrin was the first commissioner in recent history to be chosen from 
higher education. As a professor of philosophy from the University of Utah rather than 
from secondary or elementary education, and as a non-member of the NEA, he was 
offensive to the National Education Association almost by definition. But McMurrin was 
the administration's fourth choice, all of whom had declined the offer. Leaders of the 
NEA considered McMurrin to have been "the least informed Commissioner ever."25 On 
24Transcript, "Wilbur Cohen Oral History Interview," April 21, 1969, JFK Library, pp. 1-
2. 
25Lawrence Kay Pettit, "The Policy Process in Congress: Passing the Higher Education 
Academic Facilities Act of 1963" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 
1965), p. 255. 
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the other hand, representatives of the higher education groups expressed no explicit 
opinion regarding McMurrin, and considered him to have been a disinterested 
commissioner whose authority was restricted by Ribicoff anyway. Francis Keppel recalls 
that: 
Ribicoff decided to handle all the politics on Capitol Hill and 
McMurrin would sit back and think high thoughts in the 
Office of Education. Well the politics fell apart something 
terrible, and . . . a bill which had been put together with 
baling wire for higher education got on the floor of the 
House.26 
But the administration's flawed strategy was also hurt by partisan maneuvering 
and political accident. As Ribicoff had pointed out, there was a slim possibility for 
assistance to higher education based on bipartisan support. Though having wide 
support in both houses early in the year, by July any chance at a bill had been lost. The 
combination of fierce NEA opposition, House and Senate inflexibility on their respective 
bills, and Kennedy's inactivity led to its defeat. In addition, by late July the 
administration's leadership had quit, as both Ribicoff and McMurrin resigned. 
Of Kennedy's categorical objectives, only the educational television bill became 
law in the 1962 session. Congress adjourned before federal assistance for the education 
of the handicapped, education for migratory labor, adult literacy, adult educational, and 
educational quality received rules in the House. As one Democrat put it, "Charlie Halleck 
[House Minority Leader] wasn't going to let the Democrats have a college aid bill in 
September of an election year."27 
26Transcript, "Francis Keppel Oran History Interview," September 18, 1964, JFKL, pp. 
1-2. 
27Bernstein, p. 237. 
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Kennedy had hoped to take advantage of his office during the Congressional 
races of 1962 to secure a more cooperative legislature. The Cuban Missile Crisis cut 
short his ambitious campaign itinerary, but it did improve the chances of many of his 
would-be allies in Congress. Kennedy's popular conduct of the emergency deprived 
Republicans of a weapon which they had considered their most popular. 28 
Not since 1934 had a presidential party fared so well in a mid-term election. On 
the other hand, Republicans were quick to point out, the Democrats had scarcely 
recouped their large losses from Kennedy's negative coattail effect in 1960. This had left 
far fewer vulnerable seats for Republicans to recapture in 1962. Kennedy had clearly not 
altered the balance of power on federal aid in the crucial House of Representatives. 
While he successfully minimized Democratic defeats, he further antagonized important 
Republicans beyond the limits of political wisdom with his harsh politicking. 
The 1962 election was not a referendum on federal aid to education; other issues 
were more important in the voters' minds. To the extent that national issues determine 
Congressional elections, fiscal, health, farm, and foreign policy concerns loomed larger 
than education. 29 Kennedy's campaign speeches barely touched education and when 
they did, they primarily addressed college aid.30 
280n October 16th, the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Republican 
William Miller, said, "If we were asked to state the issue [in the campaign] in one word, 
that word would be Cuba--symbol of the tragic irresolution of the Administration" (New 
York Times, October 17, 1962). On December 7th, Miller and Republican Bob Wilson of 
California, Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, attributed 
their party's poor showing at the polls to the missile crisis (New York Times, December 
8, 1962). 
29Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 20(October19, 1962), p. 1933. 
30At campaign stops in Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Illinois, Indiana, and 
Michigan, Kennedy criticized the Republicans for blocking college aid. Public Papers, 
Vol. 1962, pp. 695-804. 
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The New York Times criticized the administration's faltering leadership in its 
postmortem editorial: "The President, who less than a year ago said federal aid to the 
public schools might well be the most important piece of domestic legislation, has lapsed 
into a strange silence." It also remarked that Kennedy's "lieutenants in Congress ... 
appear just as remote from the issue as former Secretary Ribicoff, who has dropped out 
of the Cabinet to return to Connecticut politics. "31 
A new approach was needed. Some method had to be found either to meet the 
individual arguments against federal aid or, in some way, bring together enough 
legislative and administrative strength to pass aid legislation despite the arguments of 
individual pressure groups. But as Francis Keppel remarked, there was now "a bitter 
relationship . . . between the school people and the college people." When this was 
added to the hostility between "the public school people and the whole Catholic world," 
a renaissance of education legislation appeared distant. 32 
1963: THE OMNIBUS APPROACH 
President Kennedy's education package for the Eighty-eight Congress reflected 
the recommendations of two White House staff memoranda in November, and the 
counsel of HEW and the Bureau of the Budget in December 1962. A November staff 
memo offered a variety of possible solutions to the problem of federal aid. To counter 
the church-state controversy, the document suggested a return to the Everson formula 
of "aid to the child" instead of "aid to the institution." To overcome the opposition to 
permanent federal support it argued for the minimization of new educational programs. 
31New York Times, September 4, 1962. 
32Transcript, "Francis Keppel Oral History Interview," September 18, 1964, JFKL, p. 6. 
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This would be accomplished by amending existing legislation and by continuing the 
departure began in 1962 from the language of crisis to the justification of federal aid as 
a catalyst for advancing social welfare and economic growth. Finally, it sought to 
overcome the legislative impasse by mixing popular and unpopular measures in an all-or-
nothing "omnibus" bill. 33 
A November 8th staff memorandum outlined the disadvantages of the previous 
session's incremental approach to education legislation and the advantages of the 
omnibus strategy. Ad hoc legislation had invited Kennedy's opponents and educational 
interests to "play off one bill against another, session after session.• In an admission that 
the "crisis" was not selling permanent support, the document stated, "we are always 
behind what is needed. Hence, the pragmatic ounce of prevention being worth a pound 
of cure is never followed." An omnibus bill, the memo continued, would not only repair 
these deficiencies, but would offer a "comprehensive legislative commitment" to the 
"dramatically" new Kennedy emphasis on social welfare and economic growth. 34 
HEW and the Bureau of the Budget agreed on the omnibus approach, but 
radically disagreed on its contents. While HEW favored emphasis on categorical aid in 
the President's message, it advocated a return to general support in the drafting of the 
elementary and secondary school bill, even though it conceded that such aid would be 
"ineffective." The Bureau of the Budget, believing HEW's agreement of general support 
was due to NEA pressure, concluded" 
33An "omnibus" bill (from the Latin word omnis, meaning "all") is one in which several 
measures are combined in an effort to attract opponents of a particular bill by tying its 
fate to that of legislation which they support. Staff Memorandum, November 7, 1962, Box 
33, Sorensen Papers, JFKL, pp. 1-2. 
34Staff Memorandum, November 8, 1962, Box 33, Sorensen Papers, JFKL, pp. 4-5. 
We believe that to include such a hopeless proposal as the 
largest and costliest one in the Administration's program 
adds a defeatist note to the entire package. We would 
prefer to drop it and to emphasize the positive selective 
approach.35 
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After the administration's education debacle of 1962, Kennedy turned to an 
educator he knew, Harvard's Francis Keppel, who had been dean of Harvard's School 
of Education since 1948. Kennedy, still furious over the McMurrin resignation, was 
present in a highly visible White House ceremony (Justice Frankfurther was scheduled 
to give Keppel the oath, but he was too ill). A Yankee Episcopalian, the Harvard 
educated Keppel was well suited by background and temperament to mediate between 
the Kennedy administration and the various interest groups, especially the Catholics and 
the NEA, and the lower versus the higher education lobbies. In addition, as a member 
of the Hovde Task Force, he believed strongly in federal aid, particularly in improving the 
quality of weak school systems. 
The new commissioner worked with Secretary Celebrezze and Wilbur Cohen in 
a pre-Christmas legislative strategy session in Palm Beach in December 1962. Their 
1963 omnibus strategy, which drew heavily from the Bureau of the Budget's 
recommendations, sought to unite the bickering education lobbies behind one bill that 
offered something for everyone. 
Kennedy also wanted Keppel to have a direct line to the Catholic Church. By 
early 1963, Keppel was hard at work trying to "neutralize the inside fighting in the 
educational world" and had opened up direct communications with Catholic interest 
groups. As Keppel recalled later: 
35McAndrews, p. 288. 
They wanted me to have--they being Sorensen, and I'm 
perfectly sure he was reflecting the president--wanted me 
to have a direct communication line to the Catholic Church, 
which the Office of Education had never had before. 36 
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Kennedy's last education message was his best. His Special Message on 
Education of January 29, 1963, began with, "Education is the keystone in the arch of 
progress." Then he delivered the powerful argument that a permanent federal role in 
education was "of paramount concern to the national interest as well as to each 
individual. "37 Kennedy also followed the advice of staff memoranda as he spoke of 
improving the quality of American education and increasing educational opportunities and 
incentives for all Americans, especially the impoverished. One historian of American 
education, Julie Roy Jeffrey, has suggested, "the social welfare theme was there in 
references to ignorance, illiteracy, and unskilled workers [and] the waste of human 
resources that existed in the United States."38 
Kennedy's speech was also significant in that he made overtures to his 
adversaries. He attempted to move away from the partisanship and uncompromising 
position which had helped to undo his previous federal aid proposals. "This is not a 
partisan measure," said Kennedy, "and it neither includes nor rejects all of the features 
which have long been sought by the various educational groups and organizations. •39 
~ranscript, "Francis Keppel Oral History Interview," September 18, 1964, JFKL, pp. 
8-13. 
37John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Education," January 29, 
1963, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Vol. 1963 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 105. 
38 Jeffrey, p. 66. 
39John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Education," January 29, 
1963, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Vol. 1963 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 105-114. 
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Contrary to his speech two years earlier, Kennedy consulted with representatives of the 
various educational groups and organizations. 40 Despite this, Kennedy did not expect 
Congress to accept the entire omnibus bill without comment. "It was perfectly clear," 
Keppel remarked, "that the President realized that he was sending up a package that 
would probably get busted up, but that if we kept the thing fluid enough, there was a 
chance of getting a reasonable part of it through. 41 
Kennedy's single omnibus bill, the proposed National Education Improvement Act 
of 1963 (H.R. 3000, S. 580) had three objectives: First, it sought to unify the diverse 
educational lobbies. Second, despite his rhetoric on aid to elementary and secondary 
education, the omnibus bill was politically centered on college aid. It focused on aid to 
higher education because it held the greatest promise of legislative success. The 1962 
college-aid bill had failed in conference as a result of partisan (Republican) objections 
to scholarships and religious (Protestant) objections to grants to sectarian colleges. 
Kennedy dropped the student scholarship provision and called for construction loans 
only for public and private undergraduate colleges, while accepting grants for all other 
categories. There was also an "air of crisis" around higher education which elementary 
and secondary education did not possess. The "crisis" revolved around the growing 
number of students enrolling in the nation's colleges. It became an issue that Kennedy 
was able to successfully exploit. In addition, aid to higher education was less divisive 
which gave Kennedy greater confidence in pressing it as an issue. Though by 1963, as 
40lbid, p. 108. 
41Transcript, "Francis Keppel Oral History Interview," September 18, 1964, JFKL, pp. 
13-15. 
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Keppel has remarked, "Kennedy was glad to pass anything."42 Third, after the repeated 
failures of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations to pass general, across-
the-board aid, the 1963 message called for "selective, stimulative, and where possible 
transitional" aid aimed at "strengthening, not weakening the independence of existing 
school systems. "43 
Kennedy sided with the Bureau of the Budget including teachers' salaries in his 
general aid program, but he restricted such assistance to starting and maximum salaries, 
and to average salaries in economically deprived areas. While he argued for a 
permanent federal role in categorical programs, he recommended a temporary general 
aid solution to meet a temporary shortage of classrooms and teachers. But as Hugh 
Davis Graham has observed, the "inherent tension" between the importance of federal 
control "on categorical grants of funds ... and state's rights ... local control remained 
largely an abstraction at the elementary-secondary school level" during the Kennedy 
administration because "the inherently controversial bill never got beyond the hearing 
stage."44 
Despite Kennedy's weakening of the teachers' salaries provision and his 
abandonment of permanent federal support. both the National Education Association and 
the American Federation of Teachers backed the omnibus package. As James 
Sundquist observed in Politics and Policy, "people do learn from experience. •45 The 
42McAndrews, p. 358. 
43Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Education," January 29, 1963, pp. 
107-108. 
44Graham, p. 45. 
45Sundquist, p. 206. 
108 
NEA had learned from its suicidal plan which had killed the higher education bill of 1962. 
What had the Kennedy administration learned? In 1963, Kennedy's leadership would 
have to match his rhetoric for elementary and secondary school aid to succeed. 
Despite this, there were signs on Capitol Hill that the deadlock over elementary 
and secondary school assistance might be broken. On January 8th, House Republicans 
replaced 67-year-old Charles Halleck of Indiana with 49-year-old Gerald Ford of Michigan 
as chairman of the party conference. They also enlarged the Republican House Policy 
Committee from 33 to 36 members to include more recently elected congressmen. 46 
On January 1 Oth, Kennedy succeeded in retaining the 15-member Rules Committee by 
34 more votes and with much less lobbying than in the 1961 struggle. In 1961 , 62 
Southern Democrats opposed Kennedy, and 22 Republicans backed him. In 1963, only 
44 Southern Democrats opposed him and 28 Republicans supported him. 47 In early 
February, the restructured Republican House Policy Committee announced a move 
toward the formulation of specific party positions on all major issues in a new effort to 
construct compromises with the Kennedy administration. 48 
Despite the opportunities presented by the Kennedy speech, greater Democratic 
unity, and more constructive Republican leadership, the Kennedy elementary and 
secondary school assistance program failed in the new Congress. The major reason was 
the omnibus strategy. Chairman of the House Rules Committee, "Judge" Smith, wrote 
to the president asking him: 
46New York Times, January 9, 1963. 
47 Congressional Record, January 10, 1963, pp. 21 ~22. 
48New York Times, February 2, 1963. 
To lead the Congress out of the maze of ... existing and 
proposed programs for aid to public education so that ... 
we may be able to have . . . a clear picture of all that is 
proposed and expected ... during this Congress. 49 
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The administration responded with a letter stating, " ... the primary purpose of sending 
to the Congress an omnibus education measure was to reduce the number of bills to be 
considered. •50 
If the administration sought clarity, Congress thought otherwise. Republican 
·Representative Charles Goodell of New York remarked: 
The sooner we jump off this omnibus, the better, because 
it is headed for a crackup; you are just going to divide the 
ranks of the supporters, unite the ranks of the 
opposition. 51 
Chairman Adam Clayton Powell reluctantly introduced the bill to his committee: "This bill 
as it is now before us might not come out of the Committee on Education and Labor . 
. . and if it did, would be emasculated on the floor of the House or in conference. "52 
Thereafter, Powell referred to it as the "ominous bill."53 Democratic Representative Edith 
Green of Oregon, who supported elementary and secondary school aid but wanted 
college aid first, remarked, "I am really at a loss to understand the omnibus approach, 
of which I have not heard any member of Congress say it was politically feasible. "54 No 
49Education Legislation, White House Central Files, Box 472, March 22, 1963, JFKL. 
50lbid, April 4, 1963. 
51 "National Education Improvement Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Education of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives," 88th 
Congress, 1st Session, February 4-27, 1963, p. 196. 
52lbid, p. 2. 
53McAndrews, p. 293. 
54"National Education Improvement Act: Hearings, House of Representatives," p. 148. 
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figure in Washington was more committed to the passage of the higher education bill, 
or pursued it in the way Green did. Yet neither Green nor any other Democrat displayed 
that same type of tenacity on elementary and secondary education. 55 Green, along with 
Chairman Powell and other representatives in the House agreed that the omnibus 
approach had no chance of success. They asked the administration to set up priorities 
for various sections of the bill. 56 
The overall response to the omnibus bill by the press was negative. On February 
1, 1963, the New York Times greeted the proposal with enthusiasm as "a radically new 
approach that concentrated on incentives for quality improvement." However, the Times 
conceded the call for transitional aid that would be phased out "runs counter to the 
realities of public life and may be nothing more than sugar coating on the budgetary 
pill."57 Time, in its editorial of February 8th, attacked the President's new approach. The 
President touched every level of education, from preschool to graduate school, in an 
attempt to get the legislation passed "at one gulp."58 The magazine predicted Congress 
would "try to untie the big package" and pass particular bills.59 
55Mrs. Green's pursuit of her goal terrified the Kennedy administration. The President 
found her very difficult on the question of breaking up the omnibus bill and avoided 
dealing with her directly. Francis Keppel recalled one meeting where the President said, 
"Well, now, Cohen, you haven't succeeded with her and Sorensen hasn't, Keppel is a 
new boy in town, and it's his turn." Transcript, "Frances Keppel Oral History Interview, 
September 18, 1964, JFKL, P. 10. 
56"National Education Improvement Act: Hearings, House of Representatives," pp. 86, 
90, 104. 
57New York Times, February 1, 1963. 
58"0ne Big Gulp," Time (February 8, 1963), p. 49. 
59lbid, p. 49. For a good breakdown on the possibilities of passage for each section 
of the omnibus measure, see "Kennedy's Latest Plan for Aid to Schools," U.S. News & 
World Report (February 11, 1963), p. 60. 
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Several other newspapers, while expressing sympathy for federal aid, attacked 
Kennedy's strategy. The Philadelphia Inquirer wrote: "The main trouble is that the new 
measure is so complex and unwieldy that no one can be quite sure what it will cost, or 
where it will lead." The Detroit Free Press maintained that "by putting all his requests . 
. . into the same almost surely doomed package, the President is resorting to political 
grandstanding." The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin declared, "the new program has its 
merits and it deserves to be analyzed on that basis rather than condemned out of hand. 
But ... the chances for enactment cannot be good."60 
The administration still believed it had presented the best possible plan. Secretary 
of Health, Education and Welfare, Anthony Celebrezze, said the bill addressed itself "to 
the entire complex of needs in American education." It was up to the Congress to accept 
all of it, reject all of it, or accept parts of it, but the administration would continue to fight 
for the entire bill. 61 
As the legislative session progressed, the omnibus approach lost ground. While 
Congressional leaders agreed that prospects were good on some elements of the bill, 
many members complained that they were being inundated with too many proposals 
without any indication of the administration's priorities. Many agreed, however, that aid 
to elementary and secondary schools was considered unlikely.62 
It was not until May 22nd that the White House abandoned the omnibus approach 
and consented to split the omnibus bill. Kennedy agreed to the division of the package 
60"Selection of Editorial Comments on President's Education Bill," February 8, 1963, 
White House Central Files, Box 473, JFK Papers, JFKL, pp. 3, 7. 
61 "National Education Improvement Act: Hearings, House of Representatives," pp. 61-
85. 
62New York Times, May 3, 1963. 
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into four bills: higher education, impacted area schools, elementary and secondary 
schools, and the remaining categorical program combined into a single bill--extension 
of the NDEA, vocational education, adult education, special handicapped education, 
university extension, library services, educational quality, and cooperative research. Five 
long months had passed since Kennedy's education message. It was time lost to 
Kennedy's inability to come up with a bipartisan approach to get the elementary and 
secondary school bill passed. 
While the omnibus package deprived the Kennedy elementary and secondary 
.education program of vital momentum, it also permitted the religious issue to gather 
strength. Monsignor Frederick Hochwalt, director of the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference (NCWC), presented a detailed analysis of the dilemma the omnibus approach 
caused for many Roman Catholics. He felt the administration was forcing an unfair 
choice upon his Church either to accept or reject the bill in its entirety.63 Monsignor 
Hochwalt also believed the bill "discriminated" against parochial schools as previous 
measures had done. He urged that the omnibus package be divided into separate bills 
distinguishing higher education from elementary and secondary schools. 
The issue of religion on elementary and secondary school aid had 1963 taking 
on the appearance of the 1961 struggle. 1961 's religious witnesses paraded before the 
Congressional committees. The press again seized the issue. And, by autumn, Kennedy 
was reenacting his unproductive 1961 strategy of negotiating with the NCWC. 
There was also an important difference to 1963. Prominent Catholic liberal 
Democratic Congressmen raised their voices in defense of Catholic school children. It 
63"National Education Improvement Act: Hearings, House of Representatives," pp. 920-
921, 960-963. 
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remained unlikely that these voices would be translated into votes against the public 
school bill which they were committed to. But their numbers greatly reduced the chance 
of a federal aid roll call, while increasing the incentive for delay. 
The civil rights movement also influenced the administration's education package. 
President Kennedy realized the controversy over segregated schools could defeat his 
omnibus bill. But as one historian of the Kennedy presidency, Jim Heath, has noted, 
"Kennedy's early approach to civil rights was basically reactive, not creative. "64 
In May, a national television audience watched policy dogs and firehoses scatter 
peaceful black demonstrators protesting racial segregation in the public facilities of 
Birmingham, Alabama. Personal intervention by Kennedy on May 8th helped bring peace 
to the streets. But bombings of the Birmingham home of Martin Luther King, as well as 
the Gaston Hotel, headquarters of the leadership of the protest, re-ignited the violence. 
Kennedy ordered federal troops into the city. On May 13th, Kennedy telegraphed 
Alabama Governor George Wallace, promising to withhold deployment of the troops as 
long as "the citizens of Birmingham themselves will maintain standards of conduct that 
will make outside intervention unnecessary."65 But no sooner had one crisis ended than 
another seemed imminent when Wallace stood in the doorway of the administration 
building of the University of Alabama vowing to prevent the admission of two black 
students. It was a threat rendered idle by Kennedy's federalization of the Alabama 
National Guard, yet it had forced a confrontation with the administration. 
64Heath, p. 73. 
65T elegram from Kennedy to Governor George Wallace, May 13, 1963, President's 
Office Files, Box 96, JFK Papers, JFKL. 
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On May 17th, the House Education Subcommittee unanimously voted to add a 
desegregation rider to the impacted aid portion of the Kennedy education package. 66 
Ten days later, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous ruling on a Memphis, Tennessee, 
case, warned against "indefinite delay• in school desegregation. "The basic guarantees 
of our Constitution are warrants for the here and now,• wrote Kennedy appointee Arthur 
Goldberg for the majority, "and unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling reason, 
they are to be promptly fulfilled. "67 
It was in this atmosphere of political prodding, public awareness, and judicial 
advice that Kennedy surged forward on civil rights. On May 18th, he told a 
predominantly white audience at Vanderbilt University in Tennessee that the civil rights 
struggle is "in the highest tradition of American freedom."68 Kennedy's June 6th speech 
to the graduating class at San Diego State College noted that "segregation in education, 
and I mean de facto segregation of the North as well as the proclaimed segregation of 
the South, brings with it serious handicaps to a large proportion of our nation's 
population. "69 Kennedy spent the next two weeks attracting bipartisan support for his 
civil rights initiatives. 
Four developments in June served notice that Kennedy's vigorous move toward 
civil rights was to be separate from his education package. The first was the civil rights 
address itself, delivered June 11, 1963. In it, Kennedy urged Congress to "authorize the 
66New York Times, May 18, 1963. 
67New York Times May 28, 1963. 
68 John F. Kennedy, "Remarks in Nashville at the 90th Anniversary Convocation of 
Vanderbilt University," May 18, 1963, Public Papers, Vol. 1963, p. 408. 
69John F. Kennedy, "Commencement Address at San Diego College," June 6, 1963, 
Public Papers, Vol. 1963, p. 447. 
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Federal Government to participate more fully in lawsuits designed to end segregation in 
public education."70 Significantly, this was a request not contained in his education 
message. The second was a June 22nd speech by Commissioner Keppel to the 
American Council on Education's Conference on Federal Programs in which he asserted 
that a cure for the nation's educational problems would have to await a resolution of its 
racial inequities.71 The third was a June 24th federal court ruling upholding the 
Kennedy Administration's new policy of withholding federal monies from racially 
segregated impacted area school districts. 72 
A final sign of the Administration's formal line between civil rights and federal aid 
was Kennedy's personal intervention in the kind of vigorous campaign of interest group 
consultation and public awareness which his education program had sorely lacked. On 
June 19th, the President met with representatives of private and public schools and urged 
them to: (a) prepare for desegregation in their schools, (b) help combat de facto 
Northern segregation, (c) inaugurate or expand education programs to "deprived" youth 
and adults, (d) organize local conferences to discuss desegregation, and (e) encourage 
desegregation through their teaching and participation on biracial commissions. 73 
Kennedy's determination to see enactment of his battered education bill was 
clearly different than his belated commitment to civil rights. The defiance of George 
Wallace and the televised images of police dogs and fire hoses at Birmingham served 
70John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil 
Rights," June 11, 1963, Public Papers, Vol. 1963, p. 470. 
11New York Times, June 22, 1963. 
72 lbid, June 25, 1963. 
73"Meeting of the President with Religious Leaders," June 17, 1963, White House 
Central Files, Box 97, JFK Papers, JFKL, pp. 1-21. 
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to create a wave of moral outrage which swept the country. The televised brutality 
represented a collective event which in turn set the president angrily against the racists. 
When Kennedy condemned racial injustice in 1963, his presidency gained a high moral 
ground it had not anticipated. In the fight for aid to elementary and secondary education, 
Kennedy came to resent the succession of legislative defeats and was determined to 
meet the expectations of the Democratic coalition that would be needed to reelect him. 
A final obstacle to the success of elementary and secondary school aid in 1963 
was Kennedy himself. Despite its eloquence, the 1963 Kennedy message on education 
contained the drawbacks which crippled his earlier initiatives. Despite his statements of 
non-partisanship, Kennedy never asked for Republican advice in the formulation of the 
bill and no significant Republican help for its passage. It was a bipartisan strategy which 
helped send Kennedy's civil rights bill through the House Judiciary Committee and 
helped pass higher education legislation in 1963. But no such cooperation accompanied 
the elementary and secondary school aid bill. The result was a continuation of 
Democratic inflexibility and Republican negativism which had destroyed the Kennedy bills 
in 1961. 
Historian and adviser to Kennedy, Arthur Schlesinger, maintains the President, 
"despite those fourteen years in Congress, had always been something of an alien on the 
Hill. "74 This had been especially true in the House where he had maintained little 
contact with the leadership. Even in the Senate, "he had never been one of the 
cloakroom boys. "75 Without the advantages of a bipartisan approach, Kennedy could 
not reach the moderates and liberals of both parties on the questions of permanent 
74Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., p. 652. 
75lbid, p. 652. 
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federal support and teachers' salaries. Despite his 1961 experience and the emergency 
of citizen's committees recommending a bipartisan solution, Kennedy resisted co-
authoring an elementary and secondary education program. 
Kennedy never brought the kind of activism to the issue of public school aid 
which proved so effective for higher education on the 1962 campaign trail and in his 
effort to move civil rights legislation from the House Judiciary Committee in 1963. At the 
time of his death, the elementary and secondary school bill was stalled in the Education 
Subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee. The absence of 
aggressive executive leadership during the previous two years contributed to 1963's 
legislative obstacles, the r.esult of which left a vacuum Kennedy had not filled at the time 
of his death. The dean of American journalists, Walter Lippmann, said of Kennedy: 
One of his two or three serious weaknesses as a popular 
leader, is that he does not want to be unpopular anywhere 
. . . with anyone, and I think that a public leader at times . 
. . has to get into a struggle where somebody gets a 
bloody nose. 76 
While Lippmann's observations could be disputed with regard to Kennedy's performance 
in other areas, it does provide an accurate description of Kennedy's role in the 
elementary and secondary school aid legislation. 
By the end of the year, the college-aid bill, vocational and medical education, as 
well as aid to exceptional children, removal of the impacted area assistance, and the 
National Defense Education Act had become law. President Johnson hailed the Eighty-
76"Walter Lippmann Interviewed by Charles Collingwood," New Republic 148 (May 18, 
1963), p. 16. 
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eighth Congress as the "Education Congress" as a tribute to his slain predecessor.n 
Johnson pledged to complete the elementary and secondary school aid bill of the 
original Kennedy program in 1964. 
I, therefore strongly urge the Congress to take early positive 
action on the unfinished portion of the National Education 
Improvement Act, particularly those programs which will 
assist elementary and secondary schools.78 
President Johnson had stressed the theme of national unity and continuity with 
Kennedy's legislative program when he addressed a joint session of Congress five days 
after Kennedy's assassination. But as Hugh Davis Graham has suggested, Johnson's 
pledge to fight for public school aid in 1964 •was more rhetoric than real . . . 1964 was 
an election year, his election year, and he had no intention of ensnarling himself in yet 
another bloody church-state fight while simultaneously battling for the civil rights bills. "79 
John Kennedy believed as he entered the White House that the nation had 
reached a consensus on domestic politics. In The Unraveling of America, historian Alan 
Matusow describes why people supported Kennedy, "not because he was extraordinary 
but because he might be-not for his achievement but for his promise. "80 In the struggle 
for aid to elementary and secondary education, the New Frontier was charted but never 
fully explored. 
nlyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks Upon Signing the Higher Education Facilities Act," 
December 16, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, Vol. 1963-64, 
Book I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 57. 
78"Remarks of the President Upon Signing H.R. 6143: The Higher Education Facilities 
Act of 1963," Sorensen Papers, Box 33, JFKL. 
79Graham, p. 52. 
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